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  2The World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) and a diverse team of partners were tasked by the International 
Development Research Centre (IDRC) to contribute to the conceptualization and development of their Rural 
Poverty and Environment (RPE) programme related to Compensation and Rewards for Environmental 
Services (CRES) by providing an overview of relevant developments in Africa, Asia and Latin America, a 
global synthesis of results and recommendations. Truly global in nature, the CRES Scoping Study was 
undertaken by the following partners and collaborators based in 7 countries across 4 continents. 
 
 
The African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS) is a Nairobi-based science, technology and 
environment policy Inter-governmental organization (IGO) that generates and disseminates new knowledge 
through policy analysis and outreach. The Centre’s mission is to strengthen the capacity of African countries 
and institutions to harness science and technology for sustainable development. ACTS strives to rationalize 
scientific and technological information to enable African countries make effective policy choices for 
improved living standards. ACTS works with partners and networks including academic and research 
institutions, national governments, UN bodies, regional and international processes and NGOs. ACTS' 
research and capacity building activities are organized in five programmatic areas: Biodiversity and 
Environmental Governance; Energy and Water Security; Agriculture and Food Security; Human Health; and 
Science and Technology Literacy. Its members are: Kenya, Malawi, Malta, Uganda and Ghana, The World 





Corporación Grupo Randi Randi (CGRR) is a non-profit corporation, whose mission is to build and 
motivate equitable development and a healthy environment, stimulating the imagination, creativity and the 
talent of our collaborators, incorporating gender, generation and ethnic equality, local participation, the 
sustainable management of natural resources and the conservation of biodiversity. CGRR was legalized in 
Ecuador in 2000, currently has 17 members, and operates a range of research and development projects, with 
international and national funding, ranging from participatory watershed management, watershed inventories 
and modeling, gender and environment, community conservation, conservation planning for protected areas 
and integrated crop management for sustainable development. CGRR is a member of the Consorcio para el 
Desarrollo Sostenible en los Andes (CONDESAN), the International Union for the Conservation of Nature 
(IUCN), the Ecuadorian association of environmental NGOs, (CEDENMA), and is a founding member of 




Forest Trends is an international non-profit organization that works to expand the value of forests to 
society; to promote sustainable forest management and conservation by creating and capturing market values 
for ecosystem services; to support innovative projects and companies that are developing these new markets; 
and to enhance the livelihoods of local communities living in and around those forests. We analyze strategic 
market and policy issues, catalyze connections between forward-looking producers, communities and 















  3The Institute for Social and Economic Change (ISEC)  is an all India Institute for Interdisciplinary 
Research and Training in the Social Sciences, established in 1972 by the late Professor VKRV Rao. It is 
registered as a Society under the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960, to create a blend of field-
oriented empirical research and advances in social science theories leading to better public policy 
formulation. Its mission is to conduct interdisciplinary research in analytical and applied areas of social 
sciences, encompassing diverse aspects of development; to assist both central and state governments by 
undertaking systematic studies of resource potential, identifying factors influencing growth and examining 
measures for reducing poverty; and to establish fruitful contacts with other institutions and scholars engaged 
in social science research through collaborative research programmes and seminars, and to conduct training 




The World Conservation Union (IUCN): Founded in 1948, IUCN brings together States, Government 
agencies and a diverse range of NGOs in a unique partnership with over 1000 members spread across some 
150 countries. As a Union IUCN seeks to influence, encourage and assist societies throughout the world to 





The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) is the voice for the environment in the United 
Nations system. It is an advocate, educator, catalyst and facilitator, promoting the wise use of the planet's 
natural assets for sustainable development. UNEP's mission is "to provide leadership and encourage 
partnership in caring for the environment by inspiring, informing, and enabling nations and peoples to 




The World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) is the international leader in the science and practice of 
integrating ‘working trees’ on small farms and in rural landscapes. We have invigorated the ancient practice 
of growing trees on farms, using innovative science for development to transform lives and landscapes. The 
World Agroforestry Centre is one of the 15 centres supported by the Consultative Group on International 















                                                        
  4 
 
About the authors 
  
 
Meine van Noordwijk   Regional Coordinator, Southeast Asia Programme, World Agroforestry Centre 
(ICRAF), Bogor, Indonesia. Contact: m.van-noordwijk@cgiar.org
 
Beria Leimona  Research Officer, RUPES Programme. World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF), 
Bogor, Indonesia 
 
Lucy Emerton     World Conservation Union  (IUCN), Colombo (Sri Lanka) 
 
Thomas P. Tomich  World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) Nairobi, Kenya.
 
 
Sandra J. Velarde  Programme Associate, ASB – Partnership for the Tropical Forest Margins,   
Nairobi, Kenya 
Mikkel Kallesoe   Senior Programme Officer, Asia Regional Environmental Economics Programme, 
World Conservation Union (IUCN), Colombo, Sri Lanka. 
 
Madhushree Sekher  Associate Faculty, Centre for Ecological Economics & Natural Resources 
Institute for Social and Economic Change. 
 
Brent Swallow   Principal Scientist and Theme Leader for Environmental Services, World 
Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) Nairobi, Kenya. Overall Coordinator of the CES 
Global Scoping Study. 
 
Acknowledgements 
The ideas presented here have gradually matured in discussions with many of the participants to the 
Regional Workshops and (co)authors of other issue papers. We gratefully acknowledge their interest and 
discussion. Ideas have also benefited from many colleagues in the RUPES network – too many to be named 
individually. We also acknowledge the generous financial and intellectual support of IDRC, particularly Dr. 
Hein Mallee 
  5Abstract  
Working markets are by definition realistic, voluntary and conditional. Their effects on poverty and human 
well-being are mixed. Many environmental problems and the increasing scarcity of ecosystem services are 
linked to ‘market failures’. Time lags, complex cause-effect linkages, and multiple layers of rights and 
responsibilities, make many environmental ‘service’ considerations externalities of decision-making 
processes focussed on ‘marketable goods’. Which combination of characteristics is needed for mechanisms 
that internalize the costs and benefits of ecosystem utilization enough to avoid environmental degradation 
beyond thresholds of sustainability? Can market-based mechanisms be pro-poor? We set out to identify 
mutually – beneficial opportunities for the ‘modifiers’ and ‘beneficiaries’ of environmental services to 
develop agreements and contracts as an alternative to a purely regulatory approach to environmental 
management. We do not ignore regulation, but rather see regulations as defining the domain for voluntary 
and conditional rewards for environmental services (ES). Inputs into the analysis are derived from theory and 
emerging practice in action research sites and pilot application schemes. Theoretical insights are drawn from 
social welfare theory (development and environmental economics and project appraisal), institutional 
economics (principal agent problems, game theory) and integrated natural resource management. We present 
a general framework to clarify the multiple pathways between poverty and mechanisms for compensation 
and reward for environmental services (8 identified so far) and a set of criteria and indicators for evaluating 
those mechanisms. Two main classes and six main criteria are formulated. The first class relates to the 
effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of compensation and reward for environmental services (CRES) 
institutions, with environmental services as the primary target. The criteria in this class relate to three 
questions that predominate in the scoping, stakeholder analysis and negotiation, and implementation stages 
of establishing a compensation and reward mechanism, respectively: Will rewards be realistic? Will they be 
voluntary? What conditionality will apply? The second class of three questions is aimed at the equity 
dimension. Is poverty linked to environmental services? Who is/will be excluded from the mechanism? Are 
the rewards ‘pro-poor’? A total of 12 sub-criteria with a range of possible indicators are proposed under the 
overall headings of realistic, conditional, voluntary and pro-poor. The paper also presents hypotheses about 
the way that various stakeholders will perceive and negotiate assessment criteria in particular circumstances. 
The paper concludes with a discussion of the possibility of a middle ground for negotiating voluntary reward 




Environmental services, ecosystem services, payment for environmental services, compensation and rewards 
for environmental services, human well-being  
  6Preface 
From the beginning of 2006 until March 2007, the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) led a consortium of 
organizations and individuals from around the world in a pan-tropical scoping study of Compensation and 
Rewards for Environmental Services (CRES). The scoping study was commissioned by the Rural Poverty 
and Environment Programme of the International Development Research Centre of Canada (IDRC) to 
identify critical issues affecting the development, operation, impacts and institutionalization of mechanisms 
linking beneficiaries of ecosystem services with stewards of those ecosystems. Particular attention is paid to 
the potential for CRES to alleviate or exacerbate the multiple dimensions of poverty: rights to productive 
assets, streams of income and consumption, and vulnerability to shocks.   
  
The scoping study included a series of regional workshops held in Latin America (Quito, Ecuador), Asia 
(Bangalore, India) and Africa (Nairobi, Kenya).  Participants presented and discussed practical CRES 
experiences from across the developing world, experiences which informed and challenged the development 
of several cross-cutting issue papers. A series of nine working papers have been prepared to summarize the 
results of the scoping study, including an introductory paper, three regional workshop reports, and five issue 
papers on key topics.   
 
ICRAF Working paper 32 – Compensation and Rewards for Environmental Services in the Developing World: 
Framing Pan-Tropical Analysis and Comparison. 
ICRAF Working paper 33 – Report on the Latin American Regional Workshop on Compensation for 
Environmental Services and Poverty Alleviation in Latin America. 
ICRAF Working paper 34 – Asia Regional Workshop on Compensation for Ecosystems Services. A component 
of the global scoping study on compensation for ecosystem services. 
ICRAF Working paper 35 – African Regional Workshop on Compensation for Ecosystem Services (CES).  
ICRAF Working paper 36 – Exploring the inter-linkages among and between Compensation and Rewards for 
Ecosystem Services (CRES) and human well-being: CES Scoping Study Issue Paper no. 1.  
ICRAF Working paper 37 – Criteria and indicators for environmental service compensation and reward mecha-
nisms: realistic, voluntary, conditional and pro-poor: CES Scoping Study Issue Paper no. 2. 
ICRAF Working paper 38 – The conditions for effective mechanisms of Compensation and Reward for 
Environmental Services (CRES): CES Scoping Study Issue Paper no. 3. 
ICRAF Working paper 39 – Organization and governance for fostering pro-poor Compensation for 
Environmental Services: CES Scoping Study Issue Paper no. 4. 
ICRAF Working paper 40 – How important will different types of Compensation and Reward Mechanisms 
be in shaping poverty & ecosystem services across Africa, Asia & Latin America over the next two decades? 
CES Scoping Study Issue Paper no. 5. 
 
The working papers are designed for relatively limited circulation of preliminary material. We anticipate that 
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Summary 
Four dimensions and 12 sub-criteria are proposed for effective, efficient, sustainable as well as 
equitable compensation and reward mechanisms for environmental services.   
 Stage  Criteria  Sub-criteria 
A. Effectiveness, Efficiency and Sustainability 
1. A broadly shared perception of cause-effect 
relations links threats to ES or to the ecosystem 
that provides ES, to potential activities to 
reduce or avoid these threats by identifiable 
actors at a relevant temporal and spatial scale 
2. The value to ES-beneficiaries of reduction or 
avoidance of the threats, relative to alternative 
ways to meet their needs, is substantive (within 
the context of the key actors) 
3. There are opportunity costs and/or 
resource access constraints for the potential 
‘ES providers’ that can be off-set or overcome 




Scoping  Effectively mi-
tigates, reduces 
or avoids 
threats to ES 
for all parties 
involved 
4. The threat to the ES and its reduction (or 
avoidance) by ES providers can be assessed 
and monitored in a transparent way, as a basis 
for conditional incentives 
5. Legitimacy at individual level: representation 
is subject to checks and balances 
6. Effective voice of all stakeholders is heard; 









being the object 
of regulation 
7. Adaptiveness of the mechanism includes a 
time frame for review and exit strategy 
8. ES-reward agreements strike a balance 
between outcome-based rewards, targets for 
agro-ecosystem conditions, activity-centered 
incentives, support for community-scale 
resource management and establishment of 
trust  
9. Sanctions  exist to deal with non-compliance 
by contract partners, within the human and legal 












10. ES reward agreements acknowledge the 
potential of environmental variability and 
change, ‘third-party roles’ (incl. climate change) 
to affect the ecosystem and its ES provision 
B. Equity 
11. ES reward mechanisms support ‘sustainable 
development’ pathways out of poverty for 
achieving Millennium Development Goals, by 









stakeholders  12. ES reward mechanisms reduce asset insecurity  
(including access to land) 
  9 1. Introduction 
1.1.  This review as part of a series of ‘issue papers’ 
This paper presents a review of criteria and indicators that can be used to distinguish between 
different types of ‘reward’ and ‘compensation’ schemes for environmental services and to eva-
luate their effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impacts on equity and poverty reduction.  
The paper is part of a broader effort to assess current concepts and knowledge about 
compensation and rewards for environmental services, framing hypotheses and identifying 
research opportunities that may help advance the effective application of compensation and 
rewards for environmental services in the developing world.   
At the intersection of the global agendas for the end of poverty (Sachs 2005) and the 
sustainability of environmental services (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005), there are 
examples of good practice in forest management (Durst et al. 2005) and eco-agriculture (McNeeley 
and Scherr 2003). Overall, however, tradeoffs between these objectives still dominate (Lee and 
Barret 2001). The first paper in this series (ICRAF Working Paper no. 32) set out a conceptual 
framework of compensation and reward schemes, recognizing a number of ‘prototypes’ of 
situations where the interaction between the beneficiaries/buyers and modifiers/sellers of 
environmental services can lead to operational reward schemes.  The paper by Kallesoe et al. (this 
series – ICRAF Working Paper no.36) shows how a multidimensional concept of poverty relates 
to the multifaceted issues of environmental degradation, ecological and environmental services.  
  The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
  (2004) has popularized the concept of 
ecosystem services, but concluded that the ecological production functions for these services 
are poorly quantified and the tradeoffs between economically-valued ‘goods’ and ecological 
‘services’ cannot yet be reliably assessed (Carpenter et al. 2006). Yet, at the global scale the 
total draw on ecosystem services for the provision of food, fuelwood, forest fibre and 
sequestration of CO2 released from fossil fuel in excess of oceanic absorption, has been 
measured using the concept of the ecological footprint (Rees 1992, 2002). It is at the lower 
scales and where the interactions between components of the footprint play a role that the 
ecological production functions are less clear. 
  Following the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, we define ‘ecosystem services’ as the 
combination of ‘provisioning services’ (goods, which make up the first three components of the 
ecological footprint listed above) and environmental services (‘regulating + cultural + supportive’ 
services, including the last component of the ecological footprint). In this paper we use ES as 
shorthand for environmental services. The ‘externality’ argument applies to ‘environmental 
services’ rather than to the ‘provisioning’ part of the broader concept of ecological services. 
  Standard economic theory suggests that markets are appropriate institutions for 
achieving effective and efficient outcomes for the ‘tradable goods’ part of ecological services, 
but that the time lags involved, the complex cause-effect relationships, incomplete and 
contested property rights lead to ‘market failure’ for most if not all of the ‘environmental 
services’ (Tomich et al. 2004a).  These environmental services tend to remain externalities in 
the private decision making process and usually involve ‘lateral flows’ that affect areas beyond 
the ‘farm’ scale (van Noordwijk et al., 2004). Market failure thus constrains the emergence of 
spontaneous sustainable and equitable solutions for land-use decisions and suggests that 
additional institutions will be needed. The expectation that ‘markets’ for environmental 
services will provide solutions as such seems to ignore the underlying reasons for market 
failure. However, there is at least some potential for strengthening processes of voluntary 
engagement and adaptive learning with the outcome-based conditionality that markets 
provide, to achieve greater efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability (Wunder 2005; 2006). 
Equity is a real concern of greater outcome-based conditionality, as control over ES tends to 
be linked to control over land and thus inversely related to at least one dimension of poverty. 
  10Exclusion from access to land is an important part of reducing threats to ES; this will worsen 
poverty unless those excluded have other options. Many ES reward mechanisms may therefore be 
expected to reduce equity – unless specific criteria are met. Expecting ‘pro-poor’ environmental ser-
vice reward mechanisms to easily emerge seems to be unrealistic and requires further analysis. 
  In this paper we will start with an institutional change perspective on the way that 
environmental issues gain in (local) political importance and can be resolved by a combination 
of regulation and rewards (‘sticks and carrots’).  We then consider the roles of various groups 
of stakeholders in location-specific versions of a reward agreement and discuss the main 
criteria that can help us to distinguish between different classes of reward mechanisms. These 
criteria are related to various stakeholder perspectives and examples will be given of how 
more specific sub-criteria can be linked to indicators of performance.  The paper concludes 
with a list of recommendations for increased donor investment in CRES, with particular focus 
on knowledge gaps and research needs. Later papers in the series will review the performance 
of existing schemes with respect to effectiveness, poverty impacts, and the role of 
intermediaries. The final paper will consider longer term trends in the international arena and 
differences between continents and countries. 
1.2.  Regulation, compensation and reward in environmental issue cycles  
Concerns over ‘environmental services’ or the ‘condition of the global or local ecosystem’ come 
and go.  They disappear from the public radar screen when they are either reframed or solved 
by effective institutions. They usually start with ‘externalities’ or consequences of land use 
decisions that negatively affect stakeholders other than the primary decision makers. The ‘issue 
cycle’ (Figure 1A) describes a sequence of stages that can be recognized in the political process 
of identifying (and challenging…) an ‘issue’, establishing clarity on the cause-effect relationships, 
spatial extent and ‘size’ of the problem and ‘attribution of blame’, in the ‘scoping’ stage. If the 
issue gains political prominence by an increase in the number of people who are concerned, and 
especially if a coalition emerges with people and institutions with strong political clout, a further 
stakeholder analysis will focus on what can be done to stop or undo the ‘root causes’, mitigate 
the impacts, or adapt to the less desirable condition, as well as an analysis of who benefits from 
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Figure 1 A. Issue cycle or stages in the political process from problem identification to solution; B. 
Cross-scale linkage of the ‘solutions’ based on regulation and/or reward of environmental service 
issues  (modified from Tomich et al. 2004b) 
 
  11The political discussion then has a number of options: 1) to ‘regulate’ the behaviour 
that leads to the problem – setting new standards of what is considered to be acceptable, with 
possible ‘compensation’, during a transition period, for the stakeholders who are affected by 
the regulation, 2) to provide an incentive scheme to ‘reward’ behaviour that will have positive 
influence the condition of the system, or 3) to stimulate stakeholders to seek solutions within 
pre-existing standards. The choice between these three options will depend on the political 
weight of the various actors and the ability of stakeholders to reduce negative effects on their 
interests (‘right to pollute’ versus ‘right to live in a pollution-free world’). Once new 
institutions (either regulatory or based on positive incentives) are in place, a phase of 
implementation and monitoring ensues, with a need for periodic evaluation and re-
assessment. As many environmental issues are linked across social-spatial scales (from local to 
national/regional and global), the institutional solutions will also have to be cross-linked 
(Figure 1B). Regulations at one level serve as boundaries to what can be ‘voluntarily’ achieved 
at another scale. 
  The relationship between regulation and voluntary, incentive-based mechanisms can 
be visualized as a ‘traffic light’ (Figure 2, further developed in Swallow et al, ICRAF Working 
Paper no. 32), with the transition between red and amber light zone determined by the mini-
mum acceptable behaviour set by regulations and the transition between amber and green 
determined by the baseline of ‘business as usual’. If there is no ‘amber’ zone (i.e. if the 
business as usual is in fact operating in the red zone, society cannot expect incentive-based 
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inflicted 
CES2a: Tradable pollution 
and ES-use rights as ‘offsets' 
CES2b: Tradable pollution 
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Figure 2. Conceptualization of the role of the four types of compensation and reward mechanisms in 
relation to existing regulation that defines ‘minimum acceptable behaviour’ (the border between 
red and amber) and current drivers of change that define the baseline ‘business as usual’ 
trajectory (modified from van Noordwijk et al. 2004b) 
  12 
For the current discussion we distinguish four types of compensation or reward mechanisms: 
CES 1 operates in the red area, and is some form of ‘polluter-pay’ compensation for damage 
inflicted; 
CES 2 is from the ‘sellers’ perspective based on partially unutilized rights to pollute or rights 
to a share of the environmental resource use (including hunting, logging or water use 
rights); from the buyers side it can be either (a) an opportunity for ‘offset’ transactions 
for buyers who otherwise would operate in the red zone (it includes ‘cap and trade’ 
mechanisms, such as allowed by the Kyoto Protocol), or (b) a buyer with a conservation 
objective who buys the rights in order not to utilize them (e.g. the conservation 
concession concept); 
RES 1 operates from the transition of the yellow to the green zone and provides rewards for 
good ‘stewardship’; 
RES 2 operates within the green zone and aims at avoiding losses and maintaining 
environmental qualities over and beyond existing legal protection. 
 
In this paper the focus will be on the voluntary mechanisms CES 2, RES 1 and RES 2, but 
some of the economic valuation issues also refer to the non-voluntary CES 1 case. When 
referring to both ‘compensation’ and ‘rewards’, we will use CRES (compensation and rewards 
for environmental services) as shorthand notation. 
  The current debate on environmental services does not start with a blank slate. A 
patchwork of regulations and opportunities for positive reward schemes applies at different 
scales, which set the boundary conditions for any new or renewed concerns over en-
vironmental issues. Specifically, the options for voluntary, positive incentive schemes 
(rewards) are constrained by the current rules on ‘minimum acceptable behaviour’. One can 
(or should) not be rewarded for what one is obliged to do. Where regulations and laws are 
substantially ahead of implementation and compliance, an approach based on positive 
incentives will likely require revisions of the regulatory framework as well. 
  Water may well be the environmental resource with the longest history of concerns 
over the public/private nature of the effects of land use. Water governance institutions often 
started with a settlers’ right that prevented newcomers from disturbing water flows to existing 
farms or households, but evolved towards more equitable sharing of rights and responsi-
bilities. Hunting rights have a long history of political contest, appropriation and regulation, 
which only gradually evolved into current concerns on wildlife conservation, as a starting 
point for broader biodiversity conservation. Climate change, greenhouse gas emissions and 
carbon stocks have been a concern of the last two decades only, and thus have been more 
able to make a ‘fresh’ start in establishing governance regimes. However, the slate is not 
completely clean.  The land-use related components of these issues via fire and smoke/ haze 
have a longer history of regulation. Existing regulation of ‘forest’ as a land cover with 
restrictions based on concerns about water, timber resources and biodiversity conservation 
also implies a complex ‘inheritance’ for climate change institutions. This complex inheritance 
is part of the reason that the ‘newer’ part of energy-related emission reductions were 
institutionally easier to incorporate in international climate agreements than ‘avoided 
emissions’ and ‘terrestrial carbon storage’.  This in part explains why there still is no protocol 
on avoided deforestation under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, although 
its relevance, with at least 20% of current net emissions, is not debated.  
 
  131.3.  Poverty dimensions and CRES institutions 
Kallesoe  et al. (ICRAF Working Paper no. 36) review a number of asset and flow-based 
dimensions of poverty and their interactions with environmental service issues of relevance to 
local and external stakeholders. In the context of the livelihood analysis framework (Carney 
1999), poverty can be defined as a critical lack in any of the five main capital types (natural, 
human, social, physical and financial) that leads to vulnerability. In the relationship between a 
local community and its outside world, we can distinguish relationships based on ‘goods’ and 
‘services’ (Figure 3), with the markets for goods as a way for converting natural capital to 
financial capital and the markets for services generally failing to do the same.   Changes in ser-
vices, however, often have marked negative and occasionally positive impacts on ‘political 
capital’ (treated as the ‘vertical’ subset of social capital), as it affects other stakeholders. 
Poverty, interpreted here as critical lack in any of the essential assets, appears by 
definition to be linked to lack of control over the production of environmental services. 
Rewards for environmental services which primarily target the stakeholders with formally 
recognized control over the services (or the natural capital that helps generate the services) 
may well enhance rather than reduce existing inequity. In fact, part of current poverty in rural 
areas is directly linked to the ‘solutions’ that have been developed to secure the supply of 
environmental services to stakeholders who have greater political clout. In large parts of the 
world a forest regulatory framework (Box 1) has developed that sets aside larges areas of land 
for ‘public’ functions that are, at least in the public perception, linked to environmental 
services (water flow and watershed protection, biodiversity conservation). The existing 
framework is a result of the historical processes of institutional reform and often under-
represents the interests of local stakeholders. Replacing ‘hard’ regulatory frameworks by 


























































Figure 3. Conceptualization of the ‘production function’ of changes in environmental services, 
alongside the production of marketable goods, utilizing five types of capital (modified from 
Tomich at al. 2004a) 
 
  Poverty is directly linked to the profitability of the locally relevant range of 
land-use options, which depends on labour availability and wage rates, land prices, local 
know-how, access to markets and the current process for linking inputs and outputs as 
externally determined. These local determinants of ‘profitability’, however, depend on the 
  14existing regional or national context, under the influence of at least five policy domains 
(Figure 4). Institutions for CRES may need to consider their interaction with each of these 

























Box 1. Forest classification systems in relation to poverty and environmental services 
 
In large parts of the world the word ‘forest’ is closely associated with the concept ‘environmental services’. Any
problem with water is in the public debate linked to ‘deforestation’ while the default approach to solving
environmental problems is ‘reforestation’ – even though the monoculture blocks of fast growing trees that are
usually the result of reforestation have little in common with the original natural vegetation of the site. 
The word ‘forest’ means anything from a stack of wood, vegetation with trees, wilderness, hide-out for
rebels, state or elite-controlled hunting and (timber) mining domain, medicine chest to regulator of water flows
and storehouse of biodiversity. In fact, the word ‘forest’ has an interesting origin as indicator of state (or royalty)
controlled hunting lands, rather than vegetation with trees. Excluding local people from access is, however, still
a common consequence of a ‘forest’ indication on land use maps, often coinciding with a ‘right’ (or assumed
right) by the state to grant concessions to outsiders for logging or even conversion to other land uses. The legal
basis of such state claims, however, may be contested, as for example in the case of Indonesia where only a
small fraction of forests has been legally confirmed to be ‘state forest’ (Contreras and Fay, 2005; on large areas
of (former) forest land multiple claimants exist and have not resolved boundaries.  
  Many countries have adopted forest policies that distinguish between forest land designated for  conversion
to agriculture or plantation forestry, forest lands that can be used for wood production (under various degrees  of
restriction and management),  forests for watershed protection, and forests for nature (biodiversity) conservation.
The latter two categories usually preclude human settlement. 
  To farmers and local land users the ‘domesticated forest’ is of particular relevance, and often words that indicate
‘garden’ are preferred to indicate ownership (Michon, 2005; Fay and Michon, 2005). The question whether or not
these ‘gardens’ can actually provide environmental services at the level required by society may be seen by some
audiences as an ‘empirical question’ that can be answered by data collection and monitoring; others, however, see
debate on such issues as undermining the case for ‘forest conservation’. Thus, efforts to secure environmental services























































































Figure 4. Schematic representation of the way the local profitability of land use options depends on 
the local levels of the five capital as well as at the national/global levels, with five policy domains 
(a…e) that influence the relation between local manifestation and national-scale characteristics: a = 
extension, b = land policies, c = non-agricultural sector development, d = market access and price 
policies and e = infrastructure and energy policies 
  15  The broad concept of environmental service rewards in fact embraces considerable 
variation that relates to the type of service, the threat that has to be mitigated, controlled or 
avoided, and the type of stakeholders. While some generalizations can be made across the 
various services, especially at the institutional level, the specifics of the local ‘issue’ that has to 
be resolved matter a lot, and need to be taken into account at ‘scoping’, ‘stakeholder 
identification’; and ‘negotiation’ stages (Figure 5). A list of ‘prototypes’ that relates to specific 













Figure 5. The four stages in voluntary ES agreements, the main roles of intermediaries and the key 
questions that need to be addressed  
Key questions: 
 
Would rewards be realistic? 
Is poverty linked to ES issues? 
Will they be voluntary? 
Who is/will be excluded? 
What conditionality will apply? 
Are the rewards ‘pro-poor’? 
    Effectiveness 
    Efficiency 
    Sustainability 












































1.4.  Four stages in developing CRES 
The scoping stage clarifies how the ES provision is influenced by the changing of land cover 
and/or land practices. A basic assumption for ‘rewards for environmental services’ is that the 
supply of these services does depend on activities of those ‘rewarded’. The perceptions of 
environmental functions and their processes among and between local people, local 
institutions, government and scientists play a key role in the negotiation for any 
environmental compensation scheme. This stage also will articulate knowledge, experience 
and perception of environmental functions and their processes among the stakeholders 
negotiating for a CRES.   
  The negotiation phase starts by identifying partners. Both providers and beneficiaries 
of ES determine the stakeholders involved in CRES. The providers begin to identify with 
whom they can communicate and prepare the documentation or ‘projectization’ that might be 
needed. On this stage, the role of intermediaries will be dominant in representing the actors 
involved effectively and equitably. This includes preparing formal and informal prerequisites 
for negotiation that expectedly will reduce the transaction cost borne by the sellers and 
buyers. Trust among multiple stakeholders can be developed in the negotiation. The providers 
will consider the tradeoffs between the rewards to be gained and the costs of having 
‘restrictions’ or ‘action’ imposed to them. The buyers will calculate the risk and guarantee of 
project success. After negotiation is completed, the next step will be the implementation of 
the project according to the agreement. Finally, the last stage of a CRES scheme is monitoring 
and evaluation of the agreement. The sellers will need to recognize and deal with free riders or 
defectors of the process internally. Monitoring and evaluating tools are important to both 
sellers and buyers. The providers will need some information on whether they have complied 
with their contractual obligations. On the other hand, the buyers will require information 
about the results generated by the contract.   
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2.  Rewards for Environmental Services: stakeholders, stages and 
agreements   
2.1.  Actors 
Elaborating on the conceptual framework of Swallow et al. (ICRAF Working Paper no. 32), 
we recognize four main actor groups, and linkages between two ‘subsystems’, the land use 
system that modifies the ES, and the subsystem of the beneficiaries of ES.  There are two 
types of linkages:  the condition of the (agro)ecosystem that generates the ES, and the set of 
regulations, recognition and rewards that provide feedback (or fail to do so…) from the 
beneficiaries to the modifiers. 
2.2.  ES-modifiers, guardians and stewards as potential sellers 
Environmental services are emergent properties at landscape scale of a complex interaction 
between the natural capital of the site (including geomorphology, climate, biota, soils), land 
use aimed at increasing the flow of goods and services to the local land users, the network of 
filter functions within the landscape that modifies the impacts of field-level land use, and the 
social fabric of the community that constrains the decisions of individual households to use 
or modify local resources. The environmental services that are thus influenced consist largely 
of ‘lateral flows’ of water, (suspended) sediments, solutes, gases and particulate matter, and  
biota or energy that are perceived as beneficial or harmful outside of the area of primary 
influence. Local land-use decisions thus affect other stakeholders. Most of the ‘environmental 
services’ are seen as public goods and thus taken for granted until the time that they are 
affected and become scarce or of lower quality. The ‘environmental issue cycle’ (Figure 1) that 
then starts provides the background for opportunities for the modifiers to be compensated or 
rewarded. 
  ES reward mechanisms can start while the environmental condition is still good and 
where ‘avoided degradation’ is the key issue. They can also start in conditions of low 
environmental quality, where ‘rehabilitation’ is the key objective. Van Noordwijk et al. (2004) 
used the terms ‘guardians’ and ‘stewards’, respectively, for these two situations. In reality there 
may be elements of both guardianship (protecting remaining landscape elements of ES value) 
and stewardship (rehabilitating other parts of the landscape) in many ES reward applications. 
However, the discussions on the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) have shown that the 
attribution issues are markedly different in avoided degradation and rehabilitation. In 
rehabilitation the positive efforts may be more easily compensated (especially where the 
‘baseline’ is considered to be zero as in afforestation /reforestation for terrestrial carbon 
storage) than efforts to protect existing stocks (where the baseline rate of degradation is 
harder to define and agree upon). Also, avoided degradation needs to be assessed over large 
enough areas to allay concerns about ‘leakage’ (negative effects outside of the target area, but 
causally linked to the target area). 
  Generally, avoided degradation is linked to control over land, and is therefore pri-
marily an opportunity for those who have secure control over substantial tracts of land – 
generally not the poorest members of the local community. Rehabilitation may be more 
directly linked to labour, the primary resource of the rural poor. Therefore, the effects of ES 
reward schemes on poverty dimensions may thus differ substantially between ‘avoided 
degradation’ and ‘rehabilitation’ issues. 
  For much of the following discussion, it is important to start with a clear concept of 
the ‘threat’ that is either avoided or mitigated by the actions that are to be rewarded. Table 1 
provides examples of such threats. 
  17  Threats derived from land uses that are prohibited by existing regulations are, at least 
in theory, handled by the enforcement mechanisms of the existing regulations.  In practice, 
however, may be a considerable gap between what is practiced and what is allowed.  
  However, for ‘reward’ mechanisms the point of departure must be what is technically 
allowed, unless the reward mechanism itself is shifting the boundaries of the regulatory 
domain. For a voluntary mechanism, the main issue for the modifiers of environmental 
services who consider forgoing the benefits that they can derive from a less-ES friendly land 
use practice, is the ‘opportunity cost’ (Table 2). 
 
Table 1. Examples of threats to identified environmental services by land uses that may well 
be more (financially) profitable (from a private perspective) than more ES friendly 
alternatives 
Threat  Environmental service affected 
Loss of habitat: Conversion of natural forest 
(or other pre-human habitat) to less ES 
friendly land use 
Protecting the integrity of conservation areas by 
preventing loss of habitat and threats at 
population level in the areas directly around core 
protection areas 
Loss of habitat functions within agriculturally 
used landscapes 
 
Direct threat to local biota by overharvesting 
Direct threat to local biota by pollution 
(agrochemicals, organic wastes, mine spoils, 
industrial waste…) 
Providing habitat for a sub-set of the original 
fauna and flora inside agriculturally used 
landscapes  
Loss of habitat in corridors between protected 
areas 
Maintaining connectivity between protected areas 
via corridors 
Genetic erosion of useful tree, crop & stock 
resources or their wild relatives 
Creating opportunities for local-level 
‘restoration’, in landscapes where connectivity is 
still maintained 
Loss of pollinators and pest control agents  Allowing extraction of potentially renewable 
resources 
Enhancing disease carriers  Regulation of pests and diseases 
Loss of landscape beauty in areas of high 
spiritual/aesthetic value 
Spiritual, religious and aesthetic values 
Loss of landscape beauty in areas for active 
recreation 
Opportunity for active recreation (ecotourism) 
Erosion of local ecological knowledge  Ecological knowledge 
Reduction of stored carbon in natural forest or 
peat soils 
Protecting natural forest area, peat soils and 
other carbon storage areas 
Reduction of stored carbon in agricultu-
re/agroforestry areas 
Protecting above- and/or belowground carbon 
stocks in areas used for (agro)forestry and/or 
agriculture 
Increasing net emission of greenhouse gasses  Accumulating terrestrial carbon stocks  
Generation of smoke and haze, affecting 
human health 
Detoxification of air, water, food 
Changing vegetation to one with greater water 
use 
Increase local water use trough irrigation 
Water transmission (total water yield per unit 
rainfall) 
Compaction of topsoil reducing infiltration 
and thus enhancing overland flow leading to 
flash floods 
Buffering (above average river discharge per unit 
above average rainfall) 
Compaction of topsoil reducing infiltration 
and reducing low flows from stored reserves 
Gradual release of stored water supporting dry-
season flows 
  18Threat  Environmental service affected 
Enhancing drainage and thus reducing gradual 
release of water in dry periods 
Gradual release of stored water supporting dry-
season flows 
Erosion leading to water pollution and 
downstream sedimentation 
Maintaining water quality (relative to that of 
rainfall)  
Erosion: transfer of soil fertility  Tolerable intensities of net soil loss from slopes 
by erosion 
Reduction of existing filter functions 
Pollution of water resources 
Maintaining water quality (relative to that of 
rainfall)  
Destabilizing slopes (undercutting slopes, 
killing trees with anchoring roots) 
Stability of slopes, absence of landslides 




Table 2 Opportunity costs in dependence of relative profitability of ES-threatening and ES-
friendly land use practices 
Opportunity cost of enhancing ES    Follow up questions: 
1  Land use enhancing ES is much less 
remunerative than current practice 
  Opportunity costs are apparently high – voluntary 
ES reward schemes will be expensive; are non-land 
use economic options exhausted?  
2  Land use enhancing ES is less 
remunerative than current practice 
  This is the classical ‘opportunity cost’ situation, 
where further quantification is needed (see 5.1) 
3  Land use enhancing ES is approximately 
as remunerative than current practice 
  What will it take to ‘tip the balance’ in farmer 
decision making 
4  Land use enhancing ES is in fact more 
remunerative than current practice 
N.B .  What stops farmers from using those better 
practices? 
5  Land use enhancing ES is much more 
remunerative than current practice 
N.B .  Are you sure? What stops farmers from doing it?? 
2.3.  ES Beneficiaries as potential buyers 
When specific environmental services can no longer be taken for granted as public goods or 
‘birth rights’, securing these services by imposing restrictions on those that negatively affect 
them is the obvious strategy of first choice for ES beneficiaries. However, it may be politically 
opportune or necessary for ES beneficiaries at least be seen to take a share in the responsibi-
lity – as many, if not all, beneficiaries are themselves also modifiers of ES. Beneficiaries of the 
ES can become ‘buyers’ , ‘providers of rewards’ or ‘providers of compensation.’  Besides their 
interests in ES, beneficiaries may also have other motivations to engage in a relationship with 
ES modifiers, including moral concerns, legal obligations, and/or trading opportunities.  The 
latter can be primarily aimed at the reputation of the individual or company, or at the actual 
continued access that the relationship provides to environmental services (Suyanto et al. 2006, 
van Noordwijk 2005). Table 3 suggests a sequence of response options to scarcity of 
environmental services.  
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Table 3 Stereotyped list of preferences of ES beneficiaries 
Level  Securing the environmental services required 
for ‘business as usual’ 
External relations 
1  Appreciate ES as public good or, preferably, as ‘club 
good’ accessible only to ‘members of the club’ 
Keep low profile 
2  Put pressure on government to enforce rules so that ES 
can be or remain  available as public good or as 
accessible ‘club good’ 
Keep low profile 
3  Reduce dependence on ES by shift in location, use of 
alternative resources or production methods 
Keep low profile 
4  Invest in environmental education and awareness so 
that ES can be available as public good or as accessible 
‘club good’ 
Publicize the efforts to increa-
se market share 
5  Invest in ‘rehabilitation’ efforts so that, after a recovery 
period, ES will become available as public good or as 
accessible ‘club good’ at low cost 
Publicize the efforts to increa-
se market share 
6  Voluntarily provide long-term conditional, realistic 
rewards for avoided degradation, to maintain access to 
ES as ‘club goods’ 
Secure forms of ‘eco label’ as 
protection for future criticism, 
or for active PR efforts 
7  Pay tax to (local) government with earmark to ensure 
availability of ES as public good 
Guard against ‘free riders’ as 
competitors 
8  Pay general tax to (local) government and hope that it 
will use part for ensuring availability of ES as public 
good 
Complain about high and 
unreasonable tax 
  
Binning et al. (2002) recognized three mechanisms for securing the investment of ES buyers. 
Firstly, direct public (government) investment for conserving the environment. This type of 
investment mostly works in developed countries where the government budgetary investment 
is secured and committed, under the influence of public debate and involvement of poli-
ticians.  Secondly, voluntary private investment involving corporations and other private 
entities from various industrial sectors. Mulder et al. (2006) listed the motivations of the 
private sectors to voluntary engage in ES reward schemes.  These are the existence of 
business opportunities, security in reducing the cost of natural resource inputs, security in the 
license to operate by managing potentially difficult relationships, increasing the price of land, 
management of reputational risk under ‘green’ or environmental-friendly branding, pride and 
morale, and corporate commitment. The Mulder et al. study also revealed that the 
corporations that are currently involved in ES investment are mostly perceived to be front-
runners in their sectors. Interestingly, some financial institutions recognize that investing in 
socially and environmentally friendly businesses carries lower-than-average risk (Mulder et al. 
2006).  Yet, there is no hard proof that voluntary ES investments generate good payoffs 
through ‘internalizing the externalities’.  Thirdly, regulated private investment involves 
trading of rights to environmental resources (CRES 2 mechanism in Figure 2). Caps or limits 
on resource use create scarcity, form the basis for investment and encourage trade.  Waage 
et al. (2006) found that a lack of buyers is the main barrier to fully actualize ES reward 
schemes that are designed in the public interest. Lack of awareness in the early stages of the 
scheme, combined with perceptions of risk and lack of clarity on the impacts on ES 
provision, can be expected. Only if stronger evidence of the business benefits of investment 
in ecosystem services becomes available, can private sector buyers be expected to become 
voluntarily involved beyond the few ‘showcases’ that their public relations professionals need. 
The bottom line for ES buyers suggests that they should invest only if the opportunity costs 
  20set by alternative service providers exceed the costs expected per unit gain in a particular ES 
and/or location.  
2.4.  ES intermediaries  
A simple criterion for CRES thus relates the emergence of voluntary transactions to a 
comparison of the opportunity costs for potential sellers and buyers. If the latter sufficiently 
exceeds the first, the unavoidable ‘transaction costs’ can be covered, and there may be room 
for net benefits, to be bargained between sellers, intermediaries and buyers (Figure 6). It is 
important to note, however, that the ‘opportunity costs’ for both buyer and seller depend on 
existing regulatory frameworks that define the scarcity of former public goods and limit the 
range of land-use options that can be considered. 
  ES intermediaries, institutions or individuals who link potential ES sellers and buyers 
play major roles in reducing ‘transaction costs’, at least in the early stages of CRES 
mechanisms. Three roles of ES intermediaries are generally recognized in bridging this seller-
buyer relationship. First, intermediaries are considered as ES supporters who can clarify the 
‘real interests’ of potential buyers and sellers in scoping and stakeholder analysis stage and 
facilitate negotiations to speed up agreements. Second, intermediaries can act as public 
advisors who give opinions to influence regulatory frameworks or the decisions or actions of 
other stakeholders in the process. Third, intermediaries can be involved as certifiers who 
(formally) confirm and guarantee the robustness of contracts 
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Figure 6. Schematic representation of  the value chain: if the opportunity costs for the seller exceeds 
the opportunity costs for the buyer + unavoidable transaction costs, no transaction is likely to 
take place; if there is space for negotiations, the benefits will be shared between buyer, 
intermediary and seller, depending on their strength in the negotiations 
 
The first role of intermediaries requires a balancing act between the interests of 
potential ES sellers and buyers, establishing trust with (and between) both sides of the 
negotiation. In the long run, a reputation of specific intermediaries as ‘honest brokers’ is the 
main incentive for them to do high quality work. In the early stages of CRES mechanisms, 
however, intermediaries may be attracted to the possibilities of maximizing profit margins. 
  Intermediary stakeholders involved in ES scheme can be multi-layered and multi-
scaled. ES sellers and buyers possibly range from individuals to aggregates of individuals or 
institutions (Figure 7). ES sellers ultimately are large numbers of individuals / households in 
the uplands or other rural areas – who will already be involved in various types of community-
  21level organizations. These grass-root organizations can also serve as intermediaries in 
representing individual sellers. ES buyers can be single organizations, such as a private 
company in a carbon sequestration scheme. On the other side, buyers may consist of large 
numbers of individuals, which usually operate as a ‘bundle’, such as the domestic water users 
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Figure 7. Schematic view of the interactions between buyers, intermediaries and sellers 
 
As a consequence, intermediaries can operate at different scales as well. In one extreme, an 
individual farmer freely negotiates an agreement(s) with the buyer(s) for each piece of land, in 
which case a seller absorbs all ‘intermediary’ roles. The other extreme condition is that a 
uniform agreement is applied to a large number of people owning large tracts of land, in 
which the buyer imposes itself as ‘intermediary’. In between, the intermediary role can refer to 
small or large groups, with varying degrees of differentiation between group members in the 
details of agreements.        
  Adapting from Griffin (1991), Kuperan et al. (1998) and Challen (2000), Mburu et al. 
(2003) distinguished transaction costs into three categories: (1) search and information costs; 
(2) bargaining and decision or contracting costs, and (3) monitoring, enforcement and 
compliance costs. The first two categories of costs occur before the institutional arrangements 
for collaborative management of natural resource are made. Therefore, the first and second 
categories are referred as ex-ante (investment) costs and ex-post (operational) costs for the third 
category. 
   The overall transaction cost can be broken down into two components (1) transaction 
cost covering interactions between buyers and intermediaries (B I) and (2) transaction costs 
covering interactions between sellers and intermediaries (S I). As illustrated by Figure 8, it 
can be expected that the transaction cost of B I will decrease as the scale of the intermediary 
increases. The reason is that larger scale intermediaries allow buyers to more easily deal with 
larger tracts of land or larger quantities of ES in single transactions. However, intermediaries 
will have more difficulties in dealing with larger numbers of individual farming household as 
ES sellers. Therefore, the I S transaction cost will increase.    
  We may expect that the total transaction costs are minimized at some scale of 
organization in between the two extremes. This is the ‘optimum’ scale of I from a buyer and 
seller perspective – it may, however, not be the optimum one from the business perspective 
of intermediaries. Under certain circumstances a combination of two ‘brokers’, one 
representing buyers and one representing sellers may be more effective than a single one. 
When we separate the ‘negotiation’ and ‘implementation’ phases, we may expect that the I   
S transaction cost is more strongly scale dependent, and as a consequence, the optimum scale 
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I    S implementation 
B   I negotiation 
B   I implementation 
I    S negotiation 
Figure 8. The way the components of transaction costs depend on the scale of ‘sellers’ 
2.5.  Government roles: regulator 
‘Pro-poor’ approaches to CRES can spontaneously arise from private sector involvement, or 
(more often) be supported by public sector involvement in CRES. Governments or the public 
sector can potentially play four roles in the interactions between sellers (providers) and buyers 
(beneficiaries) of ES. They can act as 1) buyer on behalf of ‘downstream’ stakeholders, 2) 
seller in international interactions, 3) intermediary or 4) market regulator. While different 
levels of the public sector or government can be involved in these different roles, a clear 
separation of roles is expected to be needed for transparency and public control (Figure 9). 
The government’s primary role as ‘marker regulator’ needs to be reflected across a 
range of scales from the local community to the national scale, with international conventions 
as an umbrella for cross-boundary issues. Depending on the degree and success of 
‘decentralization’, the different levels of government may either support each other in this role 
across scales, or, more often, contest overlapping authorities and thus substantially add to 
transaction costs.   
  Unfortunately, much of the existing regulation can be interpreted as not maximizing 
overall efficiency, but as maximizing opportunities for rent seeking for intermediaries (where 
intermediaries help to smooth the pathway through a regulatory jungle). Where government 
entities that regulate also (intend to) operate as an ES seller (e.g. forestry departments in 
applications of the ‘clean development mechanism’) public scrutiny of the conglomeration of 
roles is warranted. 






























Figure 9. Four main roles that the government (public sector) can play relative to private sector 




  A major long-term role for a public sector regulator of CRES agreements is to provide 
mechanisms for litigation. Conditionality in CRES can refer to essentially five ‘levels’: object-
tives, management plans, activities, condition of the agro-ecosystem, or actual ES outcomes 
(Figure 10). The last of these levels are the closest to the interests of external agents, but the 
time lags and difficulties of attribution of effects in the presence of substantial variation in 
‘natural’ events, often leads to a focus on ‘activities’ as the basis for CRES. Detailed prescrip-
tions of activities will have the inefficiencies of ‘micro-management’, and a shift to higher 
order ‘management plans’ may be appropriate. Finally, a basic agreement on the objectives 
and criteria that drive management plans may be the preferred basis for CRES, if sufficient 
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Figure 10. Five levels at which agreements on ES Reward schemes between local and external actors 
can be based: I. Consequences for the ES, II. Condition of the agroecosystem, III.Human 
activity, IV. Management plans or V. Management objectives (modified from van Noordwijk et 
al. 2004b) 
3.  Criteria for rewarding environmental services  
3.1.  Criteria and actor perspectives 
The key questions formulated in Figure 5 can now be grouped under two classes of criteria. 
The first class relates to the effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the CRES 
institutions, with the environmental services as the primary target and criteria that relate to 
three questions.  Again, these are questions are:  Would rewards be realistic? Will they be 
voluntary? What conditionality will apply?.  We postulate that the ‘realistic’ question will 
predominate in the scoping stage; the ‘voluntary’ question will predominate in the stakeholder 
analysis and negotiation stage; and the ‘conditionality’ question will predominate in the 
implementation stages.  The second class of criteria is aimed at the equity dimension (Is 
poverty linked to ES issues? Who is/will be excluded? Are the rewards ‘pro-poor’? that 
predominate in the scoping, stakeholder analysis and negotiation + implementation stages, 
respectively) 
 
  25Table 4. Four categories of criteria for CRES, viewed from the perspective of buyers, 
intermediaries, sellers and regulators.   














General criterion  Effectively mitigates, 
reduces or avoids 
threats to ES for all 
parties involved 
Engagement in-
volves choice rather 
than being the 
object of regulation 












Local ES plus livelihood 
options with minimum 
reduction in freedom and 
optimum rewards for 
efforts and assets 
Sellers also may have a 
stake in tangible, 
sustainable 
environmental services. 
For true public goods, 
for example, sellers 
also have a stake as 
beneficiaries  
Rewards offset (at 




or risks of pro-
viding the ES that 





ding production and 
investment decisions      
Sellers’ obligations end if 
conditions governing 
rewards for ES are not 
met... 
Risks are borne by 
intermediaries or buyers 
Potential sellers may be 
poor, but otherwise be 
excluded 
Relatively well-off 
sellers may seek to 
include the poor if poor 
people can threaten 





Actual flows of en-
vironmental services  
and/or 
‘Certified / tradable units 
of pollution  abatement’ 
and/or 
‘Market share based on 
social and environmental 
reputation’ 
Tangible, sustainable  
environmental service 





Costs of obtaining 
ES benefits and 






sition of regulation 
might appear to be 
an easier route to 
obtaining ES, vo-
luntary agreements 
may be more sus-
tainable 




enforcement are needed   
 
Buyers’ obligations end if 
conditions governing 
supply of ES are not met 
Risks are borne by 
intermediaries or sellers 
Positive: buyers benefit 
(ethically, politically or 
by reputation) from be-
neficial social as well as 
environmental impacts  
 
Negative: If not included 
in RES, poor people 
may constitute an 
additional threat to ES 




Matching buyers and 
sellers, efficient handling 
of all steps to reduce 
transaction costs and risks 
and/or 
Providing credibility and 
legitimacy based on ca-
pabilities, reputation and 
trust’ 
and/or   
Concern with 
environmental issues 
There are sufficient 
values accruing from 
environmental services 
to support the 
development of a 
market or payment 
mechanism 
 
Sufficient values can 
be captured from 
the beneficiaries of 
environmental ser-
vices to cover the 
transactions costs of 
implementing 
CRES and cost of 
rewards to suppliers 
and/or  
Other organizations 
are willing to 
subsidize these 




are efficient and effective, 
thereby reducing transac-
tion costs 
If intermediaries bear 
risks for non-compliance 
from either side, they are 
compensated for those 
risks or can insure against 
them to reduce exposure 
to risks 
Social conditions that 
induce intermediaries to 
seek pro-poor results 
are similar to those for 
buyers 
Intermediaries may 
have an interest in pro-
moting pro-poor RES if 
they believe this will 
increase subsidies from 
government or donor 
organizations that, in 
turn, will expand 
opportunities for 
intermediation 














broader public interests in 
social, economic and 
environmental outcomes.  
(Role may be filled by 
government or informal 
parts of civil society.)  
At any relevant scale 
(international, regional, 
local), resulting 
patterns of activities 
and investments indu-
ced by CRES schemes 
need to be compatible 
with broader en-
vironmental objectives 
(avoidance of leakage 
and/or perverse effects 
on ES).   
 
Social and political 
legitimacy of 
negotiation and 




and conflict resolution 
must conform with 
applicable legal and admi-
nistrative frameworks 
and with social norms.  
 
Protect from negative 
distributional effects 
and elite capture. 
Fundamental question: 
why combine envi-




combination than sum 
of each taken alone.  
Negative: avoidance of 
potential social conflict 
and political spillover.  
3.2 Realistic   
3.2.1  Shared perception on causation of land use – ES effects 
The basis for any CRES is – or should be – a real cause-effect relationship between modified 
land use and environmental services that are considered to be of value. Although of obvious 
importance, this is not a trivial concern. Many current Payment for Environmental Services 
(PES) schemes appear to be based on correlations (e.g. between existing forest and provision 
of water) rather than on true cause-effect relationships (e.g. where planting trees is more likely 
to reduce total water yield, at least in the short to intermediate term), or unproven 
relationships between ecosystem conservation efforts and the actual provision of valuable 
environmental services. Increasing evidence exists that in many cases these ES provision and 
values are assumed, rather than real, for example in relation to watershed protection, 
bioprospecting and ecotourism (Calder 2001; Chomitz 1998; Reid 2001; Tognetti et al 2003;  
Rojas and Aylward 2003). Providers of ES, even intermediaries, in many cases do not know 
the real effects of their land management practices on the maintenance or improvement of ES 
provisions.  Buyers of ‘environmental services’ often remain unaware of the ES provision they 
are receiving in return for their payments (or even that such values are being generated in the 
first place).  In this sense, buyers of ES are often not different from general taxpaying public 
who may not get what they pay for when it comes to forest protection (Kaimowitz 2000). 
This lack of a clear relationship between the CRES mechanisms and the intentions is mostly 
caused by substantial differences of perception among stakeholders on the relation between 
land use and provision of ES. The communication on environmental issues, the complexity of 
cascading and cumulative interaction among stakeholders often leads to these differences.  
Furthermore, the scientist’s role in finding the clarity concerning how to address the 
complexity of landscape and ES provision interactions has not been fully accomplished. For 
example, in watershed cases, many downstream stakeholders still perceive that only ‘full forest 
cover’ can guarantee the functionality of watershed and that any type of deforestation is a 
threat. On the other hand, upland land users find that more open land cover types are more 
beneficial for their livelihood and can be made compatible with their local needs for 
watershed functions (Jeanes et al. 2006). Box 2 shows a study case on RUPES experience in 
Singkarak watershed in scoping these perceptions and their degree of overlap and similarity 
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perceptions on ES is available (Table 5).  
Box 2. Bridging perception differences among stakeholders: Rapid Hydrological 
Appraisal of Lake Singkarak Watershed  
 
The rapid hydrological appraisal tool of Jeanes et al. (2005) was applied by Farida et al. (2005) in 
the Singkarak watershed in West Sumatra to analyze perspectives of a range of stakeholders–local 
communities, researchers and policy makers. A topic that appeared to be controversial is the effect 
of planting Pinus merkusii or other fast-growing evergreen tree species on the quantity of water 
supplied to the lake. Although these species were favoured by foresters for past ‘re-greening’ 
efforts, water use by canopy interception and transpiration of such trees reduces total water yield to 
the lake, and the expected increase in regularity of flow through better soil structure will not fully 
compensate this effect.  
  The hydrological model pointed to a strong dependence of hydro-electricity production on 
variations in annual rainfall and possible increase of El Niño years with long dry seasons under the 
influence of global climate change. This effect exceeds that of local land cover change. The study 
pointed to the importance of maintaining water quality in the lake for all stakeholders, with 
concerns over sediment inflow, as well as nutrients and urban waste.  
  Reforestation efforts using appropriate tree species and focused on relevant ‘erosion hot-
spot’ locations can lower sediment influx to the lake and improve regularity of water flow, but not 
directly influence the number of operating days for the hydroelectricity company. As part of these 
findings were surprising to some of the stakeholders, good communication is needed to avoid over-
responses on perceptions that reforestation is either sacred or evil. It requires ‘the right tree in the 
right place’. Two years after the appraisal a number of significant shifts can be noted in the 
portrayal of the issue and in the type of solutions sought.  
 
Before the Rapid Hydrological 
Appraisal (RHA) 
After RHA + follow up discussions 
•  Deforestation seen as the main 
culprit of all problems, including 
blackouts 
•  Focus on lake & its water quality; 
adjust scale of institution 
•  More awareness of climatic 
dependence 
•  Less blaming the upland 
deforestation for blackouts 
•  Tree planting as main solution  •  Less focus on ‘tree planting’ as the 
only or main solution  
•  Village with most tree cover 
should get highest share in 
royalties 
•  More care in planning coffee re-
intensification (Kopi Ulu) 
•  Problems with the endemic, edible 
fish (‘Ikan bilih’) linked to 
deforestation 
•  Ikan bilih problem is about 
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Table 5. Flow chart of a toolbox of appraisal methods currently under development at the 




Appraise land use, stakeholders and issues that require attention; review of 
secondary data, stakeholder appraisal of landscape, scoping of issues and 
perceived solutions, livelihood strategies; emerging technological innovations 
Land tenure  Rapid tenure (RTA) claim survey to be followed by in depth exploration of 
strongly contested claims; links to collective action, property rights; revise 
‘stakeholder’ lists 
Market access  Rapid market appraisal (RMA) of options for local products 
Land use change 
analysis 
Changes in market access 
(physical access, increase or 
decrease in policy constraints) 
 Spatial analysis of recent changes and 
current trends within the focal area and its 
wider context (accessibility)  
<== Key driver of change ==> 
 
Main environmental service of concern  

























































































Scenario analysis using FALLOW (validated on past decade of LU change), with 








Local negotiation processes – based on local/national modalities 
  293.2.2  Threats to ES – avoidance and reduction 
Across four categories of environmental value (biodiversity, carbon sequestration, landscape 
beauty and watershed function) four combinations of current condition and threat can be 
recognized (Table 6; van Noordwijk 2005). 
 
 Table 6.  Simple classification of conditions and trends of environmental services in relation 
to the likely concerns of potential CRES 










Priority for ‘avoided 
damage’ 























Figure 11. A. Conceptualization of ‘optimal threat’ in relation to ‘willingness to contribute’; B. 
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Rationality of willingness to contribute
 
Where the ‘natural capital’ is in good condition and strong threats exist, guardianship 
or ‘avoiding damage’ is likely to attract attention, such as in conserving biodiversity, protecting 
landscape beauty, reducing the probability of landslides, or maintaining clean air. Where posi-
tive human efforts can increase ES provision, such as in regulating water flows, enhancing 
quality of surface water and increasing carbon storage, restoration or stewardship is relevant. 
In the other two quadrants of Table 6 (good condition, low threat and poor condition, high 
threat), concerns for ‘additionality’ or ‘lack of permanence’ are likely to limit the willingness to 
contribute by potential ES buyers. Survey-base studies of ‘willingness to pay’ may need to be 
corrected for ‘ability to pay’ to become realistic estimators of this willingness to contribute 
and test the hypothesis embedded in Figure 11A. For a number of environmental issues it has 
been shown that part of the ‘restoration’ or abatement efforts will in fact be directly 
profitable, and thus in need of moral but not financial support (Figure 11B). The analysis by 
Tomich et al. 1996 of opportunities for use of Imperata grasslands in Indonesia may serve as 
example. This is an extreme case of ‘lack of additionality’. Please note that such cases are the 
prime target for market agents under ‘cap-and-trade’ mechanisms, and the main reason for 
regulators to be wary of such mechanisms. A recent example may be found in one of the first 
and largest so far ‘Clean Development Mechanism’ transactions approved in India which 
provided Carbon Emission Reduction credits for a switch away from chlorinated 
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HFC23, carbon trading does introduce a perverse incentive which does challenge the 
environmental integrity of both Protocols” (Montreal and Kyoto) (Schwank 2004; Paul 
Appasamy personal communication, Asia Regional Workshop on Compensation for 
Ecosystem Services, Bangalore, India, 8-10 May 2006). 
 The Rapid Agrobiodiversity Appraisal tool (Kuncoro et al. 2006) includes appraisal of 
the perceptions of the current threat level to (agro)biodiversity  relative to the ‘optimum 






























Box 3. Optimal level of threats to agro-biodiversity: not too high, not too low 
 
The Rapid Agrobiodiversity Appraisal (RABA) is an approach to appraise the location-specific biodiversity of 
a given agricultural landscape from a local as well as global perspective. It is based on the concept of 
‘integration’ of functions that maintains substantial biodiversity within productive landscape. The RABA 
approach aims at making operational ES reward schemes, with full comprehension that competition exists 
between the ‘conservation and ‘economic development’.  
The Rapid Agrobiodiversity Appraisal (RABA) was developed under the assumption that effective 
natural resource management, including biodiversity conservation, can only be achieved if there is a synergy 
between three different types of capital–human, natural and social. Threat is the combination of the value of 
the landscape (natural capital) perceived by both internal and external users of this landscape. The existence of 
traditional hunting, ethnic conflict, hunting laws and private land control for shifting cultivation should be 
considered as obstacles for the landscape in fulfilling its functions. 
For conservation investments to be efficient, an agrobiodiversity conservation initiative should not 
aim to intervene in an area with too high or too low a level of threat or too little an opportunity to address 
those threats. The ‘optimal level of threat’ for intervention is hard to determine, and probably differs between 
conservation agencies, but in the absence of threat the opportunity costs for ‘no intervention’ are negligible 
and if the threat is not matched by opportunities to counteract it, outside efforts will appear to be a waste of 
time and resources.  
  The application of the tool in Bungo, Indonesia and North Thailand.  Both sites have potential 
for an agrobiodiversity conservation initiative. The service at both sites to be advocated is the potential role as 
corridors to connect national parks. Some concerns about future challenges to engage in developing rewards 
for biodiversity conservation were mentioned. At the Bungo site, intermediaries who can find interested 
parties (buyers) to make an initial investment as part of developing a reward for environmental service are 
required. In the Northern Thailand, lack of trust is a bottleneck.  
A further implication of the ‘optimal threat’ issue is that gender-based differences in appreciation of 
local resources can shift the ‘perceived threat’: in some situations this may lead to much-needed trust that local 
beneficiaries of environmental services that were not initially heard will help secure the continuation of the 
service, once sufficiently empowered and alongside an external rewards system. In other cases, however, 
where the threat was already below the level that triggers the maximum willingness to engage, a stronger local 
appreciation of the service will lead to the expectation that the service can be provided free of charge. 
3.2.3  Value, benefits and beneficiaries of ES  
CRES schemes need to be realistic in terms of assumptions about economic value: 1) that 
ecosystems with low levels of exploitation yield valuable environmental services, 2) that 
financial and economic incentives are key drivers of land and resource use in natural 
ecosystems that reduce the provision of ES, and 3) that sufficient value can be captured from 
the beneficiaries of environmental services to adequately pay land managers to either protect 
and manage land and resources in a way that will continue to generate environmental services 
and prevent further degradation of environment in a compensation scheme. Current practice 
in designing CRES schemes, however, tends to cut corners on one or more of these 
assumptions. There is an emerging concern that in many cases both the economic benefits 
and costs of environmental conservation remain substantially under-valued, and significantly 
under-captured. A major challenge remains to ensure that CRES schemes are based on 
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maintenance and provision of environmental services. From the perspective of the 
beneficiaries and/or buyers of environmental services, it is often too readily assumed 
(Johnson et al. 2001) that 1) environmental services have an economic value in the first place, 
2) that ecosystem conservation through ES Reward schemes is a cost-effective way of 
generating particular environmental services, and 3) that the beneficiaries/users of 
environmental services are both willing and able to pay for them. Economic valuation 
techniques (Table 7; Emerton et al. 2004) usually depend on some kind of production 
function or cost-based relationship between the status of a particular ecosystem and changes 
in the provision of environmental services. Applicability of the various techniques is still under 
debate (Zhang and Li 2005; Brown et al. 2005). 
  
Table 7. Five classes of commonly used economic valuation methods that can be used in 
emergent CRES schemes (Emerton and Bos 2004) 
Approach Explanation  Applicability 
Market 
prices 
This approach looks at the market price of ecosystem 
goods and services 





These approaches, including effect on production, attempt 
to relate changes in the output of a marketed good or 
service to a measurable change in the quality of quantity 
of ecosystem goods and services by establishing a 
biophysical or dose-response relationship between 
ecosystem quality, the provision of particular services, 
and related production 
Dose-response relationships 
will depend on many co-
variates and show ‘hysteresis’ 
effects where recovery from 




These approaches, including travel costs and hedonic pricing, 
look at the ways in which the value of ecosystem goods 
and services are reflected indirectly in people’s expendi-
tures, or in prices of other market goods and services 
This may apply well to the 
landscape beauty and 
tourism case, less for other 
types of ES 
Cost-based 
approaches 
These approaches, including replacement costs, mitigative or 
avertive expenditures and damage costs avoided, look at the 
market trade-offs or costs avoided of maintaining 
ecosystems for their goods and services. 
This can provide a realistic 
evaluation of the options the 
potential ‘buyer’ has, but 





Rather than looking at the way in which people reveal 
their preferences for ecosystem goods and services 
through market production and consumption, these 
approaches ask consumers to state their preference 
directly. The most well-known technique is contingent 
valuation, while less commonly-used stated preference 
valuation methods include conjoint analysis and choice 
experiments. 
This can help to suggest the 
preferred forms of contracts 
once the need for such is 
established; it can support 
the negotiation process 
3.2.4  Cost and cost-bearer of ES provision  
From the perspective of the providers of environmental services or the recipients of reward 
or compensation, as well as for intermediaries or brokers, CRES schemes assume both that 
financial and economic compensation mechanisms are an acceptable and adequate incentive 
for land and resource users to manage ecosystems in a particular way (i.e. so as to generate 
environmental services), and that introducing and running some form of compensation 
mechanism can be sustained in financial and economic terms. 
  Just as economists have traditionally had a very narrow concept of environmental 
benefits, so the costs of environmental conservation have tended to be underestimated. 
Traditional conservation approaches, and financing, have tended to focus on the operational 
  32costs of managing an ecosystem – primarily the expenditures made on capital, infrastructure, 
equipment, policing and operations. Yet the indirect or opportunity costs of managing 
ecosystems to provide environmental services are in many cases far higher, and more wide-
ranging, than these direct costs. For example, the opportunity costs of alternative land and 
resource uses foregone due to the creation of Khao Yai National Park in Thailand are 
estimated at some 27 million Baht per year (about US$675,000), or almost nine times the 
direct management costs (Dixon and Sherman 1990). Opportunity costs primarily include the 
value of alternative land and resource uses which are diminished or foregone as a result of 
conservation, but many also have other elements such as costs associated with crop 
depredation by wild animals.  
  Valuation provides a mechanism for quantifying the nature and magnitude of environ-
mental service provision costs, and identifying the groups who bear them. Here, it is 
particularly critical that valuation encompasses distributional and equity concerns. The human 
communities who live in important natural ecosystems in developing countries, especially 
poorer and more vulnerable groups, typically rely heavily on ecosystems goods and services as 
key inputs into their livelihoods. Any management option that considers changing land use 
regimes, restricting the use of these goods and services or preventing the uptake of other 
income-generating opportunities will impose tremendous – and often untenable – livelihood 
costs on these households (Emerton et al. 2004).  
  A third set of costs relates to the actual implementation of ES Reward schemes. ES 
Reward schemes are not cost-free to operate: they require time, expertise and management, 
and incur a variety of transaction costs for buyers and sellers as well as for the intermediary or 
broker who manages the operation of the scheme. Although transactions costs can be 
substantial, and need to be factored into calculations, it is relatively rare for these values to be 
identified and understood when ES Reward schemes are designed (Tognetti et al. 2003). Even 
where they have been considered, transactions costs are often under-estimated when ES 
Reward schemes are designed. In the case of payment for carbon sequestration services, for 
example, it has been argued that there are considerable transaction costs, including those 
incurred in negotiation of contracts, carbon monitoring, carbon-credit commercialisation, and 
technical assistance for the implantation of technical operations (May et al. 2004).  
  The direct costs of ecosystem conservation and the transaction costs of ES Reward 
schemes can be estimated relatively easily, usually from the budgets of whichever authority is 
mandated to manage a particular ecosystem, or the business plan or project plan for CRES 
activities. Valuation of the opportunity costs of environmental service provision however 
typically requires a larger body of data and a wider coverage, as well as the utilization of more 
complex methods (such as effects on production) in order to encompass the wide range of 
groups and costs to whom these costs are incurred. 
  Having identified the providers of environmental services, and valued the level and 
type of costs incurred to them, additional work is still required to assess the conditions under 
which providers can be transformed into sellers of environmental services (as is required 
under voluntary CRES). Although a minimum requirement for RES, it is not self-evident that 
when the direct and indirect costs of ecosystem conservation are covered that land and 
resource users will be willing to conserve ecosystems for the provision of environmental 
services. Both the level and the type of compensation that providers are willing to accept 
must be determined. Valuing the willingness of ecosystem service providers to accept 
compensation relies in most cases on some form of contingent valuation or other stated 
preference technique. Here, distributional elements are again of particular importance, in 
terms of what levels and types of costs are being incurred by different groups of users, and 
what variation exists in the levels and types of compensation (if any) that these different 
groups are willing to accept. 
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not however end with establishing the potential and actual value of environmental services. 
Even where potentially valuable environmental services can be demonstrated to occur, it is 
not self-evident that users or beneficiaries would be either willing or able to pay for the 
services they receive. Everything up to this point is academic unless there are willing buyers of 
environmental services (Johnson et al. op. cit). It is not always the case in practice that 
beneficiaries are willing to pay for ecosystem service values received. For example, a study in 
Costa Rica’s Rio Chiquito catchment area of the Arenal watershed found that neither the 
market by itself, nor compensatory payments offered by the government for reforestation, 
provided an incentive to reforest steep slopes used for cattle ranching and agriculture 
(Aylward and Echeverria 2001). It is therefore necessary to ascertain whether the identified 
beneficiaries or users of environmental services can be transformed into buyers. Here, too, 
valuation can provide important information for the negotiation and design of CRES. There 
is now a relatively large literature which deals with determining beneficiaries’ willingness to 
pay for environmental services, and which relies in most cases on some form of contingent 
valuation or other stated preference technique. See, for example, a discussion of farmers’ 
willingness to pay for watershed services in Indonesia in Pattanayak and Kramer (2001)  and 
local residents’ willingness to pay for coastal wetland preservation in South Korea  (Pyo 2002). 
3.2.5  Gap analysis: what is the potential for capturing environmental service 
values as compensation? 
Having ascertained the value of the benefits and costs associated with environmental service 
provision, their distribution, and the potential willingness of buyers and sellers to provide and 
receive compensation, a key question is whether there exists (or can exist) the potential to set 
in place ES Reward schemes mechanisms. Here the actual / potential effectiveness of ES 
Reward schemes again depends on investigating and testing a number of assumptions about 
economic costs and benefits: that sufficient values can be captured from the beneficiaries of 
environmental services to cover the full costs of implementing CRES, and to motivate 
providers to manage land and resources in a way that will continue to generate environmental 
services. 
  The quantification and comparison of the costs and the benefits of environmental 
service provision for different stakeholders is necessary to do this. Various value-based 
criteria guide the extent to which ES Reward schemes are likely to be realistic, effective, 
equitable and sustainable. A minimum level of ES Reward schemes requires that both the 
direct and indirect costs of environmental service provision are covered (Echavarria et al. op. 
cit.), the real value of the environmental service provided and used is reflected, and that 
transaction costs are less than the difference between maximum buyer and minimum seller 
price. In order to establish that ES Reward schemes will meet these criteria, a simple cost-
benefit analysis can be used to highlight where significant gaps in costs over benefits occur for 
service providers and there is a need for compensation, where significant gaps in benefits over 
costs occur for users which there is an opportunity for capture as payment. 
  However, although fulfilling the above criteria is a necessary condition for ES Reward 
schemes to be effective, they may not by themselves be sufficient. In addition to the potential 
for ES Reward schemes to be captured and allocated, beneficiaries have to be willing and able 
to be transformed into buyers by paying for the environmental services they receive, and 
providers must be willing and able to be transformed into sellers by accepting compensation 
for the environmental services they generate. Basically, potential sellers have to be willing to 
offer environmental service at prices that buyers are willing to pay (Johnson et al. op. cit.). As 
described above, a basic understanding and analysis of both willingness to pay and willingness 
to accept compensation acts as a final check on the reality of CRES. 


















































Box 4. Fair compensation for inflicted environmental damage? 
Prevention is usually cheaper than cure – but that doesn’t mean that companies can’t cut cost by not
applying the prescribed preventive measures. 
  On May 29 2006 hot mud started to flow in a densely populated part of East Java (Indonesia)
in Sidoarjo regency. Five sources of leakages poured out huge volume of the mud to the ground. A gas
drilling company, PT Lapindo Brantas Inc. was suspected to have been negligent in their drilling
procedures; initially they claimed that the mud did not come from its well but from a source 150 meters
from the company’s well. They argued that the appearance of hot mud coincided with a 2.5 Modified
Mecarlli Intensity scale earthquake nearby. According to experts from the Meteorology and Geophysics
Agency, the mudflow was not caused by the earthquake preceding the incident.  
  On June 20, the vice-president of Indonesia stated that "Lapindo must bear responsibility,
socially and materially, for the victims of the mudflood".  The vice president visited the refugee camp
accompanied by a number of ministers. As the company is owned by the family of the Minister of
Human Welfare, the slow response has become an issue of public concern. Based on the law, oil and
gas resources  belonged to the state but their development was being done by contractors. "The
occupational accident at Lapindo`s gas exploration well and its impact on the people will be settled
jointly by the government and Lapindo. But matters relating to compensations will be settled and borne
by Lapindo", according to the vice-president. 
On June 20, Lapindo Brantas represented by its chief executive officer handed over a first-stage
compensation of Rp. 300,000 (US$32) monthly pay to mudflood victims. "This is only the first phase of
compensation. All losses suffered by villagers will be covered later by the company," according to the
company. The number of refugees at the Pasar Baru camp was recorded at 776 families or 3,092 people.
They came from the villages of Jatirejo, Siring, Renokenongo and Kedung Bendo. 
The mud kept flowing – and by 12 August it was clear that effects from the mudflow would
keep thousands of displaced residents from ever returning to their homes. The mudflow also caused
some small-middle factories to stop their operations. Fifteen factories were affected and more than 120
hectares of village paddy fields in five villages were inundated. Most of the residents, who are farmers,
have lost their livelihoods and other villages nearby are being threatened by water supplies contaminated
by the mud. Besides their physical suffers caused by the sulphurous fumes produced by the mud, most
of the refugees were under mental stress due to the lost of their property and fear of being permanently
laid off by their companies.    
The provincial turnpike was covered with 60 cm of mud. It was temporarily closed cutting the
main traffic flow from the capital city to its satellite areas and from agricultural and factory producers to
the port. The drilling company itself estimated earlier it had sustained losses of around Rp.1 billion (US$
108,695). A number of producers forcedly cut their costs by reducing their workers’ pay from Rp.
500,000 to Rp. 300,000 per month. The livelihood of 1,500 workers from 350 bags and luggage
producers were put on stakes. 
From the environmental perspective, the mudflow was found to have an above-threshold level of
phenol and a very high salinity. It contaminated the communities’ domestic water wells. The gas from
the mudflows also polluted the air and increased the air concentration of NH3 and SO2. The initial
conclusion was that the 2.3 million cubic-meter hot mudflow was dangerous and poisonous although
the level of its toxicity was still categorized as low. Furthermore, ecosystem would need decades to
recover from this accident.  Police investigation meanwhile established that the company did not  install
a pre-scribed drill casing at 8500 feet underground. Because of this, the well did not resist pressures and
finally mud started to flow – effectively unstoppable. The operator itself would suffer more than US$ 6
million as the loss of their failure to operate a gas drilling well. 
In terms of ‘fair compensation’ it is a challenge to define how far down the causation-chain one has to
go. The company staff who lost their job, the people displaced from farms and villages surely are to be
compensated. The people who lost jobs because other companies lost business opportunities, will likely
have to carry the burden themselves. The fishermen in the river and the coastal area where the mud will
be deposited will have to adjust to the reality that the river and marine ecosystem area affected. Despite
the unrest disputes of the mudflows, the villagers have proved their creativity for survival. They dried
the mud and used it as basic commodities of bricks and tile-roofs. 
  Six months after the event the Lapindo company bought all the land of the four affected
villages at the going market rate for rice paddies and settled areas, as their final bid in the compensation
issue.           
  35
Sources:”Muddy East Java Turnpike Partially Back in Operation” and “Mudflow Refugees Counting the Costs of
Drilling Disaster” (The Jakarta Post, July 7, 2006); “Menunggu Akhir Lumpur Sidoarjo” and  “Memandang
Lumpur Bukan Sebagai Bencana” (Kompas July 17 2007) 
The use of valuation does not end with the establishment of a ES Reward scheme. It is also 
necessary to monitor and track economic costs and benefits over the course of implementing 
CRES. It is only once ES Reward schemes are operational that their ultimate effectiveness 
and impact can be gauged, including the extent to which they have met particular social equity 
or pro-poor goals (Miranda et al. 2003). In addition, the ongoing effectiveness of ES Reward 
schemes depends on the criteria which have been described in the paragraphs continuing to 
be fulfilled, meaning that these indicators of value need to be regularly reviewed and re-
checked over the lifetime of a ES Reward scheme. (Landell-Mills and Porras 2001). Various 
forces and conditions may change both the benefits and the costs associated with ES Reward 
schemes and environmental service provision, which may warrant redesigning the level, type 
or distribution of payments and compensation. 
3.2.6  Sub-criteria and indicators 
Based on these considerations, we propose 4 sub-criteria for criterion I, and a number of 
possible indicators that can be used for various stages of CRES development (Table 8). 
 
Table 8. Sub-criteria and indicators for criterion I. Realistic (Effectively mitigating, reducing 
or avoiding threats to ES for all parties involved); the large (bolded) asterix indicates the 
stage (within a row) where the criterion is most relevant  













Perception gaps between relevant 
stakeholders on cause – effect 
relations f land use effects on ES  * 
    
Spatial scaling relations of the ES and 
the effects of threats (non-linearities, 
thresholds) 
* * 
  * 
Temporal relations (limits to 
recovery and reversibility, thresholds) * * 
  * 
1. A broadly shared perception 
of cause-effect relations links 
threats to ES or to the 
ecosystem that provides ES, to 
potential activities to reduce 
or avoid these threats by 
identifiable actors at a relevant 
temporal and spatial scale 
Specificity of actor roles (gender 
specific and incl. the rural poor) in 
avoidance/ reduction of threats and 
influencing conservation uses 
* 
    
Baseline of ecosystem condition 
and/or sustainable ES levels   * 
    
Perceived shortage in ES as basis for 
interest by identifiable outside 
stakeholders  * 
    
Willingness to pay (corrected for 
‘ability to pay’) for continuation/ 
restoration of the ES 
*  * 
  * 
Economic value of the ES (whether 
potential or actually captured) as 
basis for political decisions on public 
investment in specific ES 
  * 
  
2. The value to ES-bene-
ficiaries of reduction or 
avoidance of the threats, 
relative to alternative ways to 
meet their needs, is 
substantive (within the 
context of the key actors) 
Leakage: negative effects on ES 
outside of the ‘target’ area, that are 
(or can be) causally linked to interact  *   
  * 













Baselines of minimum acceptable 
ES-affecting behaviour are clear   *  * 
  
Opportunity costs of ES-friendly 
land use types with respect to the 
current baseline and to minimum 
acceptable ES-affecting behaviour 
are clear and show a significant gap 
in costs over benefits 
 * 
  
Willingness to accept studies have 
clarified which financial and 
economic incentives are needed to 
modify key drivers of land and 
resource use and potential buyers are 
aware of this level 
*  * 
  
Sufficient values can be captured on 
a long-term basis from the 
beneficiaries of environmental 
services to adequately motivate 
providers to continue to manage land 
and resources in a way that will 
continue to generate environmental 
services. 
*  * 
  
Compensation or reward reflect (at 
least) the real opportunity costs of 
providing for the ES 
*  * 
  
3. There are opportunity 
costs and/or resource access 
constraints for the potential 
‘ES providers’ that can be off-
set or overcome without major 
negative  ‘external effects’ 
(leakage) 
Additionality of the supply of the 
target environmental service relative 
to an appropriate  (dynamic) baseline 
*  * 
  * 
Transaction cost is kept low through 
efficient intermediaries and is 
explicitly recognized to ensure 
sustainability. 
  * 
   4. The threat to the ES and its 
reduction (or avoidance) by ES 
providers can be assessed and 
monitored in a transparent 
way, as a basis for conditional 
incentives 
The sellers are well-informed that the 
buyers satisfied 
   *
 
3.3  Voluntary: adaptive, efficient 
The key distinction between CRES and purely regulatory (imposed) solutions to ES issues, is 
that both buyers and sellers voluntarily agree on the nature and level of ‘deliverables’ in 
reward agreements. The ‘bargaining power’ of both buyers and sellers can increase with 
insights into each others strategies.  
  There are substantive differences in the scaling relationships of the different ES that 
influence the scale of decision-making that has to be influenced to protect or recover ES 
(Figure 12). Services such as carbon sequestration are approximately proportional to the 
fraction of area involved, and thus have ‘simple’ scaling relationships. Some environmental 
service functions only exist if everybody complies: e.g. ground or surface water quality can be 
compromised by a few point sources of pollutants, and a watershed will only generate clean 
  37water if all actors follow restrictions. Other functions, such as the maintenance of species 
richness or adequate filter functions for overland flows, can in fact be achieved at near-
maximum levels on only part of the total area of a catchment.  This scaling relationship of the 
ES influences the degree of ‘collective action’ that is needed to generate the ES at a level that 
















































































Figure 12. Schematic scaling relationship between the landscape level of ES production and the 
fraction of the landscape that is managed in an ES-friendly way (modified from van 
Noordwijk et al., 2004) 
 
Transaction costs tend to have strong economies of scale and can be brought back to 
acceptable levels if a sufficient number of smallholders agree to act collectively, but intra-
group costs will dominate once an optimal group size is reached, unless an effective layered 
hierarchy emerges (see discussion of Figure 9). These group decisions restrict the individual 
freedom of the members, and are thus at risk of defection and free riding. 
Collective action and interactions that involve common property rights have a typical 
problem of representation, where local elites can capture private benefits by selling off 
community rights, claiming to be legitimate representatives. Based on substantial, and often 
acrimonious debate, guidelines have been developed to assess the degree of ‘free and prior 
informed consent’ for individual members of local communities involved in transactions of 
land rights. The Roundtable on Sustainable Oil Palm has recently pioneered the development 
of criteria and indicators in this regard, that can be of use for ES-related transactions of land 
use rights and voluntary acceptance of restrictions on land use and land cover change. Early 
attempts to acquire land for carbon sequestration projects has, for example, lead to serious 
concerns over loss of autonomy and rights, similar to conversion for the plantation sector. 
The only way for the rural poor to respond to such cases in the past has been the use of fire 
as a weapon (Suyanto et al. 2004; Dennis et al. 2005). An important sub-criterion for 
voluntary transactions is the clarity on exit strategies from contracts for either of the 
contractants and for fair procedures for conflict resolution. 
0   Fraction of landscape managed ES-friendly   1
ES baseline of minimum acceptable beha-
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Table 9. Sub-criteria (numbering continued from Table 8) and indicators for criterion II. 
Voluntary: engagement involves choice rather than being the object of regulation; the large 
(bolded) asterix indicates the stage (within a row) where the criterion is most relevant 








5. Legitimacy at indi-
vidual level: representa-
tion is subject to checks 
and balances 
‘Free and prior informed consent’ 
(FPIC) of community members is 
secured where ‘community scale’ 




Box 5. Case study in application of scale / RUPES Sumber Jaya: individual coffee
plot management versus subcatchment level cooperation for low sediment loads 
 
Sumberjaya is a subdistrict in the mountain range (Bukit Barisan). That mountain range spans
along the west coast of Sumatra and forms the upper watersheds of all major rivers on the island.
The 55,000-ha subdistrict almost coincides with the Way Besai upper watershed.  About 40% of
the subdistrict is classified as ‘protected forest’ and 10%, as a national park. Nevertheless, forest
cover has declined from 60% in 1970 to 12% in 2000, leaving vast areas of deforested hillsides
bare. Simultaneously, coffee farms have increased tremendously. 
  Land tenure for forest land stewardship (HKm) is the main reward mechanism proposed
for watershed protection through better land protection and tree planting in farmers’ coffee
agroforestry system. The second scheme being tested in the Sumberjaya watershed is the
establishment of an environmental service transaction between the local hydroelectric power
company and the upstream communities.  
  Two approaches have been undertaken for the second scheme in reducing the
sedimentation level of the Way Besai river. The first one is to engage the private owners of coffee
garden in a land conservation program. The land conservation program involves farmers at two
sub-watersheds in applying sediment pits combined with ridging and natural vegetative strips on
their private lands. A reverse auction was conducted to capture the opportunity cost of farmers in
joining such programs. This method was also effective in filtering different enabling land
conditions for farmers in applying the contracted offer and in allocating the contracts to the
‘winning’ farmers. The argument in using this approach is that the environmental outcomes
cannot be increased in short term. Budget limitation of the buyer will be distributed unevenly –
only within ‘winning’ farmers – which can result on ‘patchy’ land management in a sub-
watershed.  
  The second one is to involve the community within a sub-watershed in decreasing the
sediment loads. The detailed hydrological research from ICRAF played an important role in
recognizing the sedimentation ‘hot-spot’. Combined with local people’s knowledge on source of
erosion, these people would work together in ‘fixing’ the hot-spot. The activities varied from
compacting soil for small roads and trails, building small dams to trap sediment in the river, and
putting wooden-blocks along the river ridges to avoid land slides. This approach is  expected to
reduce sediment levels in the stream within the time frame of a year, without prescribing the
solution. It builds on and supports local creativity. 
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legal, but ES-threatening activities 
are accepted, contract partners 
have  had access to negotiation 
support and are aware of their 
‘bargaining power’ 
* * 
   6. Effective voice of all 
stakeholders is secured 
through negotiation 
support  
Transparency of information 
across literacy, gender and wealth 
strata   * 
  
Responsibilities are balanced by 
rights in an institutional 
framework with provisions for  
arbitration and conflict resolution 
  *  * 
 
Built-in commitment to impact 
studies and learning from 
experience 
  *   *
7. Adaptiveness of the 
mechanism includes a 
time frame for review and 
exit strategy  
Exit strategy  (risk, length of 
contract)  *   * 
 
3.4  Conditional: effective, transparent 
The basic logic of any market transaction is that ‘delivery’ and ‘payment’ are logically related, 
even though a book keeping of debit and credit can de-couple the two temporarily.  ‘Market 
failure’ in the case of environmental services is, among other factors, linked to the fact that 
‘delivery’ of such services is not easily measurable and transparently linked to actions of 
sellers, while threats to temporarily withhold the service in case of non-payment are hardly 
implementable as means of exerting pressure (and tend to be not easily reversible if 
implemented). Many CRES mechanisms thus rely on perceptions of services (as stated in 
section 3.2) and good faith between the contracting partners. 
  Figure 10 introduced five levels at which conditionality of CRES can be envisaged, 
with the likely advantage of using multiple levels in any particular scheme and the 
opportunities for the gradual development of trust (level V) over time.  At the first level, the 
contractual relationship is based on the establishment of a set of criteria and indicator on the 
actual supply of ES. Examples can be payments per m
3 of clean water derived from a 
watershed or the amount of electricity produced on a hydro-electric scheme. ‘Pay what you get’ 
(and no more) is attractive for the buyers.  However, there may be substantial costs and 
complications involved in the measurement, as baselines are debatable and the level of the ES 
is often strongly influenced by external factors, such as the year-to-year variation in rainfall, 
the occurrence of ‘extreme events’ (including hurricanes, earthquakes or tsunami’s), and 
processes of global change (climate change, sea level rise, exotic invasive species) that have a 
potentially strong effect on the ES level. Especially where the supposed ES providers are poor 
and have little capacity to absorb risk, it may not be fair to (fully) implement conditionality at 
level I.   
  At the second level the actual condition of the agro-ecosystem is taken as the basis for 
conditionality. A stock-based approach has potential advantages over a flow-based accounting 
of ES, as it is easier to observe. Remote sensing techniques continue to improve in spatial and 
temporal resolution, while automated interpretation and calibration procedures have been 
developed. However, the costs of such monitoring are not yet negligible, imagery tends to be 
incomplete due to e.g. cloud cover (especially in the humid tropics…) and the procedures are 
not error-free. Classification errors of 10% in pixel-level analysis of remote sensing images are 
deemed satisfactory – but are problematic if major CRES implementation decisions are linked 
to pixel-level data. 
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agreed actions. An example of this would be maintaining good land management that meets 
specified restrictions or protects a piece of land that is ecologically sensitive.  Payment for the 
time spent on agreed ‘rehabilitation’ efforts, regardless of the final impact on the return of ES 
may make sense for risk-averse poor actors, but grades into regular public investment projects 
paid at or below the local minimum wage rate. Yet, it forms a ‘fall back’ criterion of 
opportunity costs of labour, if an effective and efficient monitoring system can be found. A 
link to level II criteria may be useful, e.g. where the number of trees planted remains visible 
proof of planting effort. From the buyers’ perspective, conditionality based on effort, 
however, is not very attractive, as it requires substantial supervision costs. For the sellers it 
can easily lead to micro-management and loss of freedom to innovate and enhance efficiency 
(enhanced efficiency can be easily perceived as ‘fraud’ in effort-based accounting…)  
  The fourth level of conditionality is not concerned with the details of what land users 
do on a day-to-day basis, but is focused on overall management approaches. Adaptive co-
management has become a popular phrase in management of forest resources, relying on (and 
potentially strengthening) community-scale decision and control processes. A focus on the 
management level is based on (and constrained by) the communities’ right to regulate internal 
use patterns and transform the resource by making improvement, providing linkages to risk-
sharing and conflict resolution (Carlsson and Berkes 2005).   
  As existing ES issues may well be linked to perverse incentives in the national 
or local management level, a focus at this scale is relevant. Stop ‘PUPES’ (punishing upland 
poor and the environment) before ‘RUPES’ or ‘To Not Punish is To Reward’ introduced by 
Gouyon (2003) is relevant at this stage. For example, lifting policies that promote 
environmentally harmful practices or/and discriminate against the poorer or smaller farmers. 
Harmonizing of perceptions on managing the environment to achieve ‘win-win solution’ is 
acknowledged by the external stakeholder, who will ‘pay for the way they (the local actors) decide on 
what to do or what not to do’.     
At the fifth level the conditionality takes a further step back and is expressed in terms 
of trust. At the start of the Integrated Conservation and Development Programs (ICDP) 
there was an element of (in hindsight naïve) trust that indigenous people would manage all 
natural resources sustainably if left to their own devices. Conditionality based on trust 
obviously requires mechanisms for evaluating whether or not past trust has been justified, but 
it may form a basis for a long-term more equitable relationship. Ferraro and Simpson (2005) 
referred the ICDP as indirect intervention in meeting the environment and development goals 
that are likely to require a sustained flow of funds over time to maintain conservation 
outcomes over long-term.  Meaning, support and trust of mutually agreed objectives and 
criteria become the main basis of this practice.           
Axelrod (1997) took the classical cooperation/defection problem (Prisoner's 
Dilemma) to agent-based modelling studies of coping strategies for errors in perception or 
implementation, emergence of norms and development of a shared culture between new 
political actors and regions. While the simple ‘tit for tat’ strategy (start with cooperation but 
immediately respond to defection) is superior to less cooperative strategies, it is open to 
errors. In environments with at least some ‘random noise’ a ‘tit for two tats’ is superior, as it 
accommodates some ‘erroneous interpretation’, but even that may loose from more 
cooperative strategies. In a very cooperative world, however, rogue defectors have a chance to 
exploit the soft side of society. Application of these concepts to the dynamics of 
‘conditionality’ of CRES may help to understand the significance of ‘errors of perception’. 









Box 6. Agri-environment schemes do not effectively protect biodiversity in Dutch
agricultural landscapes – based on Kleijn et al., 2001 
 
Roughly 20% of the European Union's farmland is under some form of agri-environment
scheme to counteract the negative impacts of modern agriculture on the environment. The
associated costs represent about 4% (1.7 billion euros) of the European Union's total
expenditure on the Common Agricultural Policy and are expected to rise to 10% in the near
future. Two instruments have been part of the EU's common agricultural policy for a long
time. A specific percentage of the obligatory set-aside is supposed to be assigned to nature
conservation tasks. To gain maximal ecological benefit from these spots, specific conservation
measures may be necessary as well. Therefore, the compulsory module of set-aside is
complemented by voluntary agri-environmental programmes that compensate farmers for costs
arising from specific management activities defined by nature conservation demands (Berger et
al., 2006). 
  Although agri-environment schemes had been implemented in various countries for
well over a decade, until 2001 no reliable, sufficiently replicated studies had been performed to
test whether such measures have the presumed positive effects on biodiversity. Kleijn et al.
(2001) presented the results of a study evaluating the contribution of agri-environment schemes
to the protection of biodiversity in intensively used Dutch agricultural landscapes. They
surveyed plants, birds, hoverflies and bees on 78 paired fields that either had agri-environment
schemes in the form of management agreements or were managed conventionally. Their results
were as revealing as statements that the emperor doesn’t have clothes. Management agreements
were not effective in protecting the species richness of the investigated species groups: no
positive effects on plant and bird species diversity were found. The four most common wader
species were observed even less frequently on fields with management agreements. By contrast,
hoverflies and bees (which were not the primary target of the agreements) showed modest
increases in species richness on fields with management agreements. Their results indicated that
there is a pressing need for a scientifically sound evaluation of agri-environment schemes. Since
2001, broader comparisons have been made, in a number of European countries, but the
results again showed only small positive (if any) effects on what was the stated target of the
environmental service rewards. 
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Table 10. Sub-criteria (numbering continued from Table 9) and indicators for criterion III. 
‘Conditional: service and compensation are dynamically linked’; the large (bolded) asterix 
indicates the stage (within a row) where the criterion is most relevant 








Outcome-based quantification of 
effects on welfare (livelihood 
options) and identified 
environmental services 
* *  *  *
II. Rewards linked to a pre-
defined condition of the agro-
ecosystem (e.g. maintenance of 
forest cover, presence of 
indicator organisms) 
* *     
III. Activity-based rewards for 
labour invested relative to wage 
rates 
  *  * 
 
IV. Community management 
plans and the sanctions to 
implement them 
  *  * 
 
8. ES-reward agreements 
strike a balance between 
outcome-based rewards, 
targets for agro-ecosysem 
conditions, activity-
centered incentives, support 
for community-scale 
resource management and 
establishment of trust 
V. Trust and respect for 
objectives of the rural 
communities 
  *  * 
 
Options to reduce/withdraw the 
rewards if ES provision is non- 
existent 
*  *  * 
 
Ways to deal with free riders and 
defectors within the community  *  *  * 
 
9. Sanctions exist to deal 
with non-compliance by 
contract partners, within 
the human and legal rights 
of both sides (linked to exit 
strategy in 7) 
 
Options to reduce/withdraw the 
service when rewards are not 
provided 
*  *  * 
 
The way environmental ‘force 
majeur’ (including ‘extreme 
climatic events’, invasive exotic 
organisms) is accounted for in 
risk sharing clauses 
  *  *    10. ES reward agreements 
acknowledge the potential 
of environmental variability 
and change, ‘third-party 
roles’ (incl. climate change) 
to affect the ecosystem and 
its ES provision 
The way the influence of other 
actors is accounted for as ‘force 
majeur’ 
  *  *   
3.5 Pro-poor 
The Millennium Development Goals provide a number of different entry points for the 
publicly supported goals of poverty reduction, and many countries have since developed 
Poverty Reduction Strategies. The MDG focus on health and income have direct links to 
environmental quality, through the provision of clean water and sanitation, and rural 
livelihood strategies, respectively. The MDG focus on education may relate to CRES as it will 
facilitate communication and negotiation processes. These relationships to CRES may, 
however, remain rather indirect. 
  Ethical principles suggest that respect, tangible benefits to poor stakeholders engaged 
in the CRES processes, social justice, gender, welfare and intergenerational equity need to be 
considered in any rural development activity, including CRES, at least as a point for potential 
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sellers can be partitioned in multiple ways. ‘Pro-poor’ may be interpreted as indicating that an 
additional portion of the value would go to the seller where these are poor smallholders. Of  
course, this conflicts with the direct interests of buyers and intermediaries – unless the next 
steps in the chain have an explicit appreciation for such allocation and/or public sector 
regulators or civil society organizations working in the broad public interest are able to 
influence such pro-poor outcome. Since CES often are linked to land area, there is an obvious 
risk of enhancing disparities in local distribution of income even if all local people are 
relatively poor on a global scale. In this context, we distinguish 'weakly' and 'strongly' pro-
poor mechanisms. By weakly pro-poor, we mean mechanisms that redistribute income from 
relatively well-off buyers to relatively poor sellers, but that don’t actually improve the income 
distribution among those relatively poor sellers. The term 'strongly pro-poor' may be used for 
any mechanisms that actually improves equity locally (that have the greatest positive impact 
on the relatively poorest among suppliers). Employment opportunities for landless laborers at 
a wage rate above the current local one may be an example of ‘pro-poor’ mechanisms. 
Although there is substantial variation in the relative distribution of poverty and political 
power across the landscape, in substantial parts of the developing world, fertile alluvial plains 
that were formed by deposition of materials eroded from the mountains and uplands have 
been the basis of economic and political power since historical times, especially where the 
mouth of a navigable river allowed participation in the emerging global trade in forest and 
agricultural products. In much of Asia the ‘upland people’ have not been part of mainstream 
political processes and the remaining forests of the uplands have been associated with political 
dissidents and rebels. Quantitative analysis of patterns of rural income still tends to confirm 
substantive inequalities along an upland – lowland gradient – although there are important 
exceptions in situations where fertile upland plains with favourable climate have taken on the 
centre role and coastal zones of low accessibility the periphery role. Figure 13 indicates a 
number of stages in the (stereotypical) relationship between lowland centres of power and 
upland people (Van Noordwijk et al., 2005):  
1.  Unequal power relations are so clear and upland people so poorly organized that the 
conflicts are subdued 
2.  Upland groups are well organized and can exploit the geographic strengths of their 
position to balance the lack of numerical power in open conflicts 
3.  Recognition of the benefits of cooperation emerges when the biophysical basis of 
‘conflicts (e.g. the perception that all lowland problems with water flow are caused by 
deforestation of the uplands) is challenged and/or when the costs of continued conflict 
are seen to be excessive relative to the expected gains 
4.  With realization of the potential benefits of cooperation, the traditional mistrust and 
negative perceptions (where lowlanders look down upon upland people, as strange as this 
may sound) become replaced by emerging positive relations 
5.  The establishment of realistic, conditional and voluntary CRES becomes possible and 
provides positive feedback to the emerging trust. 
Where ‘lack of voice’ is an important dimension of rural poverty, the emergence of CRES 
may require significant steps in reducing inequality in the negotiation stage – but can, if 
successful, become an important contributor to poverty alleviation. Positive effects of CRES 
on poverty reduction may thus derive from a number of different pathways. Eight have been 
recognized so far in the RUPES program (Table 11). They address different dimensions of 
(rural) poverty. 
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C. Enhancing ‘bridging capital’ & trust
4 
D. Strengthening the ‘CRES bridge’: clear Criteria & Indicators monitoring… 
5 
A. Enhancing bon-
ding capital in 
‘upland’ group
Conflict, more balanced power  2 
Upland interest group
Conflict, unequal power & influence 1 
Lowland interest groups  Diffuse upland people




B. Debunking myths,  
shifting paradigms, 
reducing distance 
3  3 
C. Enhancing ‘bridging capital’ & trust
4 
C. Enhancing ‘bridging capital’ & trust
4  4 
A. Enhancing bon-
ding capital in 
‘upland’ group
Conflict, more balanced power  2 
Upland interest group
A. Enhancing bon-
ding capital in 
‘upland’ group
Conflict, more balanced power  2 
A. Enhancing bon-
ding capital in 
‘upland’ group
Conflict, more balanced power  2  2 
Upland interest groups
Conflict, unequal power & influence 1 
Lowland interest groups  Diffuse upland people
Conflict, unequal power & influence 1 
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Figure 13. Stages (1…5) in the relationship between ‘lowland’ and ‘upland’  stakehol-
ders and activities (A…D) that can contribute to more equitable and productive relations, 
balancing ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ forms of social capital (van Noordwijk et al. 2005) 
   







P1  Stop negative 'drivers' that enhance poverty and degrade 
environmental services ('PUPES') 
Assets, Risk, Health, Indirect 
income 
P2 
Enhance local environmental services and resources (e.g. 




Enhanced security of tenure, reduced fear of eviction or 
'take-over' by outsiders, allowing investment in land 
resources; increased asset value 
Assets, Risk, Indirect income 
P4  Enhanced trust with (local) government, increased 'say' in 
development decisions 
Empowerment, Reduced 
informal taxes (corruption) 
P5  Increased access to public services (health, education, 
accessibility, security) 
Health, Education, Indirect 
income 
P6  Payment for labour invested at a rate at least equal to 
opportunity cost of labour 
Direct income (labour based) 
P7  Increased access to investment funds (microcredit or 
otherwise) for potentially profitable activities 
Indirect income 
P8  Entrepreneurism in selling 'commoditized' environmental 
services 
Direct income (land based) 
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Gender-based differences in access to resources and participation in public decision making 
may be seen as an additional aspect of poverty. Although proper analysis of the gender 
dimension of CRES would require a separate chapter, a number of hypotheses can be 
formulated for the different stages of CRES negotiation:  
1. In situations where the relationship between rural communities and representatives of 
government is characterized by latent or open conflict over access to land and other natural 
resources, there is limited scope for gender-related differences in perspective and action to 
be expressed. 
2.  Gender-related differences in perspective and preference need to be taken into account in 
the scoping and stakeholder identification stage by ‘honest brokers’ to support the emergen-
ce of efficient and sustainable mechanisms, as gender-specific perspectives will otherwise 
affect the implementation of agreements.  
3.  Gender-based differences in appreciation for local environmental services can either 
strengthen or weaken the negotiation position of a local community, depending on the 
externally perceived level of overall threat to the environmental service at stake and the 
‘optimum threat’ level, as a high local appreciation of environmental services undermines 
the additionality argument of providing services for outside beneficiaries, but strengthens 
the trust in implementability. 
4.  Specific enhancement of the role of women in the negotiations over natural resource mana-
gement with government and other external actors is possible and can meet externally set 
criteria and indicators of ‘representativeness’, but adds to the transaction costs. 
5.  Gender specific perspectives on the form of conditionality and the approach to monitoring 
compliance (at plan, activity, agroecosystem and/or environmental service level) can reduce 
the implementation costs and enhance sustainability and effectiveness, justifying the initial 
increase in transaction costs. 
Table 12. Sub-criteria (numbering continued from Table 8) and indicators for criterion IV. 
‘Pro-poor: equity effects are taken into account and mechanisms selected are positively 
biased towards poor stakeholders’; the large (bolded) asterix indicates the stage (within a 
row) where the criterion is most relevant 
 













Role of control over land, rather 




Comparative advantage of poor 
ES providers  * * 
  
Equity impact of exclusion and 
inclusion  * * 
  *
11.ES reward mechanisms 
support ‘sustainable 
development’ pathways out of 
poverty for achieving 
Millennium Development 
Goals, by addressing the 
priorities (and criteria…) of 
‘poor’ stakeholders  Gender impact of the ES-enhan-
cing activities, the rewards and its 
effects on local ES 
* * 
  *
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issue rather than optimization; 
negative ‘discount rate’ on 
environmental qualities to reflect 
future scarcity  
  * 
  *
Remove unnecessary trans-action 
costs and investments, and who 
bears the burden 
* * 
   
Proportion of total payment to 
stakeholders below local poverty 
line 
 *  **
Institutions and intermediaries 




Successful capacity building 




Interventions contribute to local 
livelihoods (employment effects)   *   *  *
 
Transparency in local 
management of funds     **
Reform of regulations aimed at 
protecting ecosystems and their 




Where poor groups benefit from 
ES provided, tied to basic needs  *   * 
 
12. ES reward mechanisms 
reduce asset insecurity  
(including access to land) 
Risk management linked to 
potential loss of land        
 
4. Discussion 
4.1.  Relations between the 4 classes of criteria 
After identifying sub-criteria and possible indicators for each of the 4 criteria, we can now 
reflect on the relations between them, across the 4 stages identified Table 13). Although we 
have so far presented the 4 criteria as representing independent axes, there are interactions. 
One can argue that either of the three ‘effectiveness’ criteria can partially substitute for the 
others: 
-  if the mechanism and reward levels are truly realistic, they don’t need to be voluntary 
(and may be imposed on all citizens by a fair and benevolent society) and the need for 
constant learning through conditionality is not so obvious (unless overall conditions 
are changing and science is advancing); 
-  if the mechanism and reward levels are truly voluntary, they will reflect what parties 
think is realistic and are willing to pay and willing to accept; 
-  if the mechanisms and reward levels are truly conditional and part of an active 
learning cycle, it is less important that they have the details right on being realistic, as 
gradual adjustments are built in. 
In reality, none of the three criteria can be met to the full extent, however, so none of them is 
redundant – but as a whole the set of criteria is probably ‘over-specified’: a partial match with 
each of the targets may suffice to reach the goals of effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. 
However, the degree to which partial matches are sufficient is a matter for further empirical 
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conclusion is in line with the tentative conclusion of Wunder (2005) that a strict definition of 
Payments for Environmental Services leads to the inevitable conclusion that no current 
examples match the target, while there appears to be examples of at least partial success by 
mechanisms that don’t meet all the criteria. 
  The role of pro-poor (and pro-gender-balance) mechanisms is still controversial. On 
one hand essential pre-conditions for entering into contracts on conditional delivery of 
environmental services are not met for many of the rural poor without secure land tenure, 
without trust in relations with outside agents, without ability to litigate if the other side does 
not meet contractual obligations, and without collateral to obtain financial capital at 
reasonable cost. Environmental service ‘rewards’ that make progress in these pre-conditions 
(compare table 8) may be more relevant than financial payments of low amounts per capita.  
  Yet, without a ‘pro-poor’ or ‘pro-gender-balance’ approach, it is likely that the 
resulting mechanisms will increase inequity and continue to impose costs on the poor while 
providing benefits for the better-off. All mechanisms that take control over land as their basis 
are likely to fall into this category. But seemingly ‘neutral’ mechanisms proposed by 
conservation agencies, may well lead to a situation where the rural poor have to pay for the 
conservation priorities set by those who are better off (see Box 7).   
In further reflection on the 4 levels of conditionality introduced in Figure 10, we may 
recognize four contrasting ‘paradigms’ in the current debate (Table 14): 
A.  Advocates of strict conditionality at outcome level, with financial payments as the least 
patronizing and most flexible instrument (Wunder 2005, 2006), 
B. Benefits (rewards or payments) for land users who voluntarily accept restrictions on their 
land use, with conditionality at the level of the land cover (observable), assuming that this 
leads to the environmental services of interest, 
C. Co-management of the landscape with shared responsibility, conditional tenure and direct 
rewards for labour invested,  
D. Delegating authority and responsibility to local stakeholders. 
Intermediate positions and hybrids are possible. 
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 Stage  Criteria Sub-criteria
A. Effectiveness, Efficiency and Sustainability 
1. A broadly shared perception of cause-effect 
relations links threats to ES or to the ecosystem 
that provides ES, to potential activities to 
reduce or avoid these threats by identifiable 
actors at a relevant temporal and spatial scale 
2. The value to ES-beneficiaries of reduction or 
avoidance  of the threats, relative to alternative 
ways to meet their needs, is substantive (within 
the context of the key actors) 
3. There are opportunity costs and/or resource 
access constraints for the potential ‘ES 
providers’ that can be off-set or overcome 
without major negative  ‘external effects’ (leakage)
I. Realistic  Scoping  Effectively mi-
tigates, reduces 
or avoids 
threats to ES 
for all parties 
involved 
4. The threat to the ES and its reduction (or 
avoidance) by ES providers can be assessed and 
monitored in a transparent way, as a basis for 
conditional incentives 
5. Legitimacy at individual level: representation is 
subject to checks and balances 
6. Effective voice of all stakeholders is heard; free 









being the object 
of regulation  7. Adaptiveness of the mechanism includes a 
time frame for review and exit strategy 
8. ES-reward agreements strike a balance between 
outcome-based rewards, targets for agro-
ecosystem conditions, activity-centered 
incentives, support for community-scale resource 
management and establishment of trust  
9. Sanctions  exist to deal with non-compliance 
by contract partners, within the human and legal 













10. ES reward agreements acknowledge the 
potential of environmental variability and 
change, ‘third-party roles’ (incl. climate change) to 
affect the ecosystem and its ES provision 
B. Equity 
11.ES reward mechanisms support ‘sustainable 
development’ pathways out of poverty for 
achieving Millennium Development Goals, by 
addressing the priorities (and criteria…) of ‘poor’ 
stakeholders 







stakeholders  12. ES reward mechanisms reduce asset insecurity  
(including access to land) 





















Box 7. Stopping encroachment into a national park by reducing profitability of 
uncertified coffee production… 
 
The Bukit Barisan Selatan national park in Sumatra is recognized by the UNESCO as a World 
Heritage Site, but declaration of the park has not been effective in reducing the rate of forest 
conversion (Gaveau et al., 2007), with encroachment for coffee production next to illegal logging as 
primary concern for conservation agencies. As direct ‘law enforcement’ approaches have failed to 
be effective for a variety of reasons, a major international conservation NGO recently started a 
campaign to put pressure on all coffee importers from Lampung to ensure that they don’t buy 
coffee ‘tainted’ with illegal coffee. Although only 5% of the coffee from Lampung is produced in 
the park, it may be mixed with up to 45% of all coffee exported. To make illegal coffee less 
profitable, and in the hope that the farmers/ squatters will give up, the NGO suggests that a 
‘certification of origin’ scheme will be required by all coffee importers who want to avoid getting a 
bad name. That such a certification scheme will have costs for the 95% of coffee producers outside 
of the park has not been part of the considerations and so far no solution has been suggested for 
this aspect. Most of Lampung coffee is produced by smallholders who operate above the poverty 
line when prices are good, but fall back below if the prices crash. The discussion continues at the 
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Paradigm A Paradigm B Paradigm C Paradigm D
Markets Regulating Payments for actual 
Environmental Services provided 
(PES) – level 1  
Rewarding/Paying Land Users for Accepting 
Restrictions on their Land Use  – level 2  
Co-Managing Landscapes for  
Reducing Poverty and Enhancing ES – 
level 3  
Integrated Conservation and 
Development Projects (ICDP’s) – 
interactions at level 4  
Type and Level of Rewards/Payments 
   Recurrent monetary payments 
 
   Recurrent monetary payments 
 
   Negotiated, conditional tenure 
security 
   Reduction of current  land use 
conflicts 
   Investment in ecofriendly 
enterprises will lead to long-term 
payoffs for both rural welfare and 
conservation 
   New flows of income     Substantial new funding & investment 
resources for poverty reduction 
   Reduction of conflicts and collateral 
damage to both environment and 
rural welfare 
   Modest new financial transfers 
   Trust between conservation 
agencies and rural communities 
will allow for mutual benefit  
   Price level is fully negotiable, the 
market price is the right one (by 
definition) 
   Fair price for sellers depends on knowledge 
of opportunity costs for the land user  
   Buyers ‘efficiency’ is protected by requiring 
‘additionality above baselines’ 
   Improved public services (above 
baseline) can be a suitable form of 
rewards  
   Essentially public investment to 
enhance welfare at the level of 
society 
Target Population; Poverty Effects 
   Land owners or at least 
persons/agencies with secure de facto 
control  
   Uplands and ‘indigenous’ people in 
and surrounding areas of high 
conservation value 
   Land owners or at least persons/agencies 
with secure de facto control 
   Any marginalized communities, incl. 
migrants 
   No explicit poverty target, but 
trickle down economic benefits are 
expected 
   Money is the most universal form of 
payment; anything else is 
‘patronizing’ 
     Pro-poor mechanisms can be constructed 
through targeted financial transfers 
   Monetary flows can be captured by 
local elites and diverted 
   Disadvantaged groups prefer ‘public 
services’ 
   Rewards based on health, education, 
roads, access may be effective and 
‘pro poor’ 
   Poverty targets are embedded in 
the choice for the site  
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Assumed characteristics of the environmental service 
   The ES is ‘divisible’ and at least 
proportional to the activity of 
providers 
   Exclusion from the service is possible 
   ‘Optimum levels of threat’ are the main 
selling point for providers  
   Land use prescriptions are 
the most effective way of 
guaranteeing persistence of 
the service, as they can be 
easily monitored and 
understood 
   Environmental services are  ‘emergent 
properties’ and only exist if all land users are 
involved 
   ES thus require land use planning & 
management 
   Need trust, shared responsibility for effective co-
management of landscapes  
   Integrity of the core protected 
area implies continuity of the 
environmental services 
   The main function of the ‘buffer 
zone’ is to provide local income 
while protecting integrity of the 
core area 
Attribution of ES; Conditionality of ‘Rewards’ 
   No LU prescriptions/ micro-
management as long as the service is 
there payments will continue; 
stimulates local inventiveness and 
increase in efficiency of ‘producing’ the 
service desired 
   Clear, identifiable ES can be 
attributed to providers & 
activities 
 
   Complex causality, no simple attribution possible 
in many cases 
   Public funding justified when ES provision 
(result) depends on level of participation  
   (Broader ‘emergent properties’ of ES provision) 
   Integrity of the core area is the 
target 
   Potentially any positive externality 
(lateral benefit flow) or desirable 
condition can be rewarded 
   Payments are conditional to  ‘service 
indicators’ 
   Only those land use 
prescriptions that generate 
lateral benefit flows that 
exceed a baseline of 
‘business as usual’ can be 
rewarded  
   Must have (enforce) baseline of ‘good’ behaviour 
   Expected/normative quality standard is non-
trivial 
   Rewards must build on standard of improved 
care 
   The investment cannot be 
withdrawn, conditionality is 
replaced by ‘trust’ and self-
interest in mutual goals 
Local Institutions   
   Local institutions can help reduce 
transaction costs and provide 
economies of scale 
   Strong local organizations 
needed 
   Ready for project cycle 
transactions and 
negotiations 
   Local conflict resolution needed 
   Access to info about landscape level ES is 
priority 
   Environmental education needed:  formal & 
informal channels  
   Environmental education needed:  
formal & informal channels 
Priority Actions 
   Establish clear guidelines of 
land use practices to be 
avoided/ promoted 
   Create replicable, payment models  
   Reduce transaction costs & provide 
economies of scale 
   Measure opportunity costs 
   Stop lose-lose scenarios for poverty & 
environment (Prevent/reduce ‘PUPES’)  
 
   Establish trust in clearly 
prioritized areas of high 
conservation value Table 15. Tentative ranking (1 = weak, 2 = medium, 3 = strong) of the land use 
dependence, relative CRES potential and pro-poor options of different types of 
environmental services 








Protecting the integrity of conservation areas by preventing loss of 
habitat and threats at population level in the areas directly around 
core protection areas 
3 3  2 
Providing habitat for a sub-set of the original fauna and flora 
inside agriculturally used landscapes   3 1  2 
Maintaining connectivity between protected areas via corridors   3  2  3 
Creating opportunities for local-level ‘restoration’, in landscapes 
where connectivity is still maintained   3 1  3 
Various forms of ex situ conservation   0  0  0 
Protecting natural forest area, peat soils and other carbon storage 
areas   3 1  1 
Protecting above- and/or belowground carbon stocks in areas 
used for (agro)forestry and/or agriculture   3 1  3 
Restoration, increase in tree cover (in a ‘sustainable harvest’ regime 
the time-averaged C stock of a land use system does not depend 
on the growth rate, but on maximum stock at time of harvest)  
3 3  3 
Accumulating wood and other products derived from recent plant 
production in, for example, the form of houses, furniture, paper, 
organic waste dumps  
1 1  1 
Regulation of pests and diseases   3  1  1 
Detoxification of air, water, food   3  3  2 
Spiritual, religious and aesthetic values   3  2  1 
Opportunity for active recreation (ecotourism)   3  2  2 
Ecological knowledge   2  1  1 
Allowing extraction of potentially renewable resources   3  3  3 
Non-renewable resource mining   1  2  2 
Nutrient and water supply for agricultural crops, fodder and trees   3  3  3 
Biotic relationships: pollination, pests, diseases and their control   3  2  1 
Water transmission (total water yield per unit rainfall)   2  2   
Buffering (above average river discharge per unit above average 
rainfall)   2 3   
Gradual release of stored water supporting dry-season flows   1  2  2 
Maintaining water quality (relative to that of rainfall)   3  3  2 
Stability of slopes, absence of landslides   2  2  2 
Tolerable intensities of net soil loss from slopes by erosion   3  2  1 
Microclimate effects on air humidity and temperature   3  1  1 
 
 
A simple way of stating what it takes to get effective ES reward mechanisms going is 
to get the science right (‘realistic’), the institutions right (‘conditional, pro-poor’) and 
the right-left politics right (‘voluntary’). We hope that the further articulation of these 
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criteria as formulated here can be further tested in its applicability by analysis of 
existing cases, and in helping many new examples emerge. 
 
4.2.  Hypotheses  
Table 16. Hypotheses for further research on CRES mechanisms 
 
  Hypotheses Comments 
1 A  partial mimicking of the realistic, conditional and vo-
luntary characteristics of a ‘market’ is sufficient to achieve 
effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and equity for ES 
reward mechanisms 
Most mechanisms known to date 
share ‘negotiation’  elements with a 
‘market’, but also imply ‘shared 
responsibility’  
Indicators for the monitoring stage of voluntary, conditional 
reward mechanisms need, for the sake of sustainability of the 
mechanism and decreased transaction costs, themselves to be 
the outcome of a negotiation process and need to address 
‘compliance’ issues at input (activity) level to secure the 
sellers interests and the effects on the actual ES involved to 
satisfy the buyers 
Many existing mechanisms for 
‘watershed functions’ seem to fall 
short on being ‘realistic’ and lack 
transparent criteria for monitoring 
and evaluation. Most criteria we 
know of relate to ‘compliance’ of 
activities rather than effects on the 
ES involved 
2 
3  Monitoring and reward conditionality based on ES outcome 
is desirable from an adaptive management perspective, but 
applicability is constrained by a) costs of monitoring, b) 
difficulty in attribution of changes across actors because of 
exogenous environmental variability, c) limited ability by 
(poor) stakeholders to absorb risks and d) formalizing 
punishment of the poor runs against social norms and ethics  
Adaptive management theory 
suggests the importance of short 
feedback and learning loops, but 
most ES rewards apply to situations 
with complex causality. 
Development of a long-term ‘trust’ 
relationship is an essential part of 
mechanisms known to date 
4  Uniqueness and requirement for site-specificity of each 
negotiation can be achieved at manageable transaction costs 
if better cross-site learning and a semi-structured approach 
become available, as there indicators for scoping and 
negotiating stage can be shared more widely than those for 
the implementation and monitoring stage (compare 
hypothesis 2) 
Designs for ‘rapid hydrological 
appraisal’ and ‘rapid agrobiodi-
versity appraisal’, both in the 
context of rewards for ES are aimed 
at providing cost-effective support 
to site-specific negotiations; their 
applicability remains to be tested. 
5  Indicators needed to establish causality and realistic rewards 
in the scoping and negotiation stage typically will not be 
appropriate and cost-effective for assessing conditionality 
and impact 
The requirements for data differ 
between the stages, focussing on 
causality (process) early on and 
spatial variability (pattern) at 
compliance stage 
6  More effort and higher quality of preparatory work by 
intermediaries in the scoping and negotiation stage will be 
essential for achieving sustainable, pro-poor outcomes, 
because of the impediments to imposing conditionality and 
outcome-based indicators  
Linked to hypotheses 3. As there is 
limited scope for mid-way 
corrections, it is important to get 
started on the right track, esp. 
where actors are poor 
7  In situations where the relationship between rural 
communities and representatives of government is 
characterized by latent or open conflict over access to land 
and other natural resources, there is limited scope for local 
differences in wealth and gender-related differences in 
perspective and action to be expressed 
Under external conflict, an internal 
‘closing of the ranks’ tends to 
prevail. External attention for 
internal distinctions is perceived as 
divisive.  
8  Gender and wealth related differences in perspective and 
preference need to be taken into account in the scoping and 
stakeholder identification stage by ‘honest brokers’ to 
Although it may require some 
diplomacy (compare hypothesis 7), 
reliance on self-proclaimed 
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support the emergence of efficient and sustainable 
mechanisms, as gender and wealth specific perspectives will 
otherwise affect the implementation of agreements  
‘representatives’ is not sufficient, 
and explicit attention to local 
differences in roles, perceptions and 
preferences is appropriate  
9  Gender and wealth based differences in appreciation for local 
environmental services can either strengthen or weaken the 
negotiation position of a local community, depending on the 
externally perceived level of overall threat to the environ-
mental service at stake and the ‘optimum threat’ level, as a 
high local appreciation of environmental services undermines 
the additionality argument of providing services for outside 
beneficiaries, but strengthens the trust in implementability 
The ‘optimum threat’ hypothesis is 
in line with qualitative evidence so 
far, but lacks quantification 
10  Specific enhancement of the role of (poor) women in the 
negotiations over natural resource management with 
government and other external actors is possible and can 
meet externally set criteria and indicators of 
‘representativeness’, but adds to the ‘transaction costs’ of the 
mechanism. 
The effects on transaction costs are 
not quantified yet 
11  Gender and wealth specific perspectives on the form of 
conditionality and the approach to monitoring compliance 
(at plan, activity, agroecosystem and/or environmental 
service level) can reduce the implementation costs and 
enhance sustainability and effectiveness, justifying the initial 
increase in transaction costs 
Quantification is needed to make a 
‘business case’ rather than 
normative preference for ‘pro-poor’ 
CRES 
12  Underwriting scoping and negotiation stages to ensure 
sustainable pro-poor RES mechanisms can compete with 
other development investment in achieving poverty 
reduction 
Hypothesis remains to be tested at 
relevant ‘sustainability’ scale, but 
some positive, effective examples 
exist (e.g. Sumber Jaya) 
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  Issue Action  suggested 
1  In countries with a history of strong regula-
tion of resource access, reform of land use 
regulation aligned with development of RES 
mechanisms is essential to balance rights, 
resources and responsibilities and reduce the 
poverty of excluded groups 
IDRC might consider linking follow-up 
engagement on CRES to the Rights & 
Resources initiative 
2  The more indicators for monitoring are 
activity- rather than outcome-based, the 
more urgent it is for the sustainability of the 
mechanism to build in periodic evaluation 
and reassessment into the agreements 
In all efforts to assist the design of ES 
reward mechanisms, financial allowance 
should be built-in to periodically assess 
impacts and re-evaluate the mechanism 
3  The current set of 12 (sub)criteria is proba-
bly over-determined but the necessary 




The current set of 12 (sub)criteria  probably 
needs rephrasing (and/or reframing) to adapt 
to the existing variation in culture, socio-




Specific attention  for pro-poor and pro-gen-
der balance is so far based on normative 
grounds rather than on the basis of 
effectiveness and efficiency; testing the 
‘business case’ for pro-poor mechanisms 




Support the use of the typologies and cri-
teria as a framework for synthesis of 
ongoing experience and the actual suc-
cess rate achieved, as well as for a prio-
ritization of future action research aimed 
at increasing diversity of learning sites 
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